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Executive Summary 
This paper presents a strategic analysis of online education, in particular, massive 
open online courses (MOOCs), and the disruptive impact of MOOCs on traditional face-
to-face higher educational instructional models.   
In 2012, MOOCs expanded on a grand scale.  Backed by tens of millions of 
dollars in funding, provided mainly by elite universities such as Harvard, Stanford and 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and enabled by advances in 
technology, MOOCs made adult learning, for the first time, free to anyone worldwide.  
The MOOCs phenomenon continues to grow with institutions such as the Futurelearn 
consortium in the U.K. and the Berlin-based start-up “iversity”. 
Using the concept of disruptive innovation, this paper will show how the 
landscape is changing in higher education and why Simon Fraser University (SFU) 
should be concerned about the effect that MOOCs are having, and the threat they pose to 
institutions reliant solely on traditional instructional, face-to-face, delivery models.  
The internal and external industry analysis presented in this paper reveals that it is 
important to look for new educational and instructional business models.  Some of the 
reasons cited are: rising student debt, stagnant student funding from government, 
increasing administrative and overhead costs, changing demographics, and the potential 
decline in international student enrolment - currently a significant revenue source for 
higher educational institutions in British Columbia.     
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The finding in this analysis is that MOOCs are disruptive and challenge the 
traditional educational model.  Universities are being asked to account for the value and 
actual quality that they provide to students and society and provide greater access to 
education for less cost. The rapid rise of MOOCs worldwide in the last year, tells us that 
the status quo is no longer sustainable.  MOOCs are compelling many universities to 
react, to re-think and re-engineer current instructional models with the goal of creating a 
more effective and efficient system of learning, one that is more student-centric. 
This paper identifies three strategic alternatives and reviews each to determine 
which model best improves SFU’s value proposition. They are: 
 Maintain current business model 
 Develop Online courses and MOOCs to increase delivery options 
 Hybrid model  
In conclusion, this paper recommends that SFU develop and implement a hybrid 
instructional learning model, one that incorporates online learning technology and 
learning analytics with face-to-face instruction to transform the student’s overall learning 
experience.  This model, with its student-centric approach, will help SFU achieve its 
expected learning outcomes, strengthen its value proposition and improve its competitive 
position by increasing customer utility or willingness to pay.  More importantly, it will 
prepare students for life by equipping them with knowledge, skills and transformational 
experiences.  It will help them achieve their educational and professional goals.   
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1: Introduction 
“Revolution Hits the Universities - Nothing has more potential to lift more people 
out of poverty – by providing them an affordable education to get a job or improve the job 
they have.  Nothing has more potential to unlock a billion more brains to solve the world’s 
biggest problems.  And nothing has more potential to enable us to re-imagine higher 
education than the massive open online course, or MOOC, platforms that are being 
developed by the likes of Stanford and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
companies like Coursera and Udacity.” (Friedman, Thomas L - The New York Times, 
2013, p. 1) 
This paper will explore online education, in particular, the rise of massive open 
online courses (MOOCs) and the disruptive impact that MOOCs are having on traditional 
(i.e. face-to-face) instructional models at Simon Fraser University (SFU).  Today, with 
the rapid advances in technology, universities have to rethink how they do business.  
Disruptive technologies in the area of online learning are challenging the long-term 
sustainability of the traditional university business model.  In addition, there are now 
mounting questions surrounding the actual quality and value that universities provide to 
students and the society as a whole.  Government, parents and students are calling for 
universities to provide more skills-based programs that better prepare students for jobs 
available in the economy.  Students are also looking for more interactive and engaging 
learning experiences and improved options for course accessibility and availability so 
that they can complete their programs on time.  
This analysis will focus specifically on MOOCs, the threat that MOOCs may have 
on the traditional (bricks and mortar) business model, and why the status quo is no longer 
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possible. It will show that the higher educational landscape is changing in the area of 
online course delivery (i.e. MOOCs) and that traditional face-to-face instructional models 
will be impacted as technology advances. This paper will address the following points: 
 Understanding the MOOC trend, is there a business case? 
 What can SFU learn from MOOCs (i.e. “Coursera”, edX, Udacity) so not to 
become obsolete? 
 What are the implications for SFU? 
 Are blended models an alternative?  
 How does SFU respond to changing delivery modes? 
The following strategic analysis of post-secondary higher education will focus on 
SFU.  SFU’s vision is to be “the leading engaged university defined by its dynamic 
integration of innovative education, cutting-edge research, and far-reaching community 
engagement.” (SFU, 2013)  The scope of this paper covers undergraduate and graduate, 
domestic and international post-secondary students in B.C., with a focus on teaching, but 
not the research conducted at the universities reviewed. 
The analysis will review SFU’s current position; the markets it competes in; and 
what strategic option(s) are available to SFU to better achieve its expected learning 
outcomes (as specified in its Academic Plan) and improve its value proposition.    
The internal and external analyses are presented in different sections of this paper.  
The internal analysis provides a background of SFU’s current strategic position, 
identifying areas of strength and vulnerably.  Next, an industry analysis of the post-
secondary educational sector is performed, using Porter’s five forces framework and 
identifying the political, environmental, social and technological factors affecting the 
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higher educational landscape in B.C.  The analysis continues with a review of SFU’s 
sources of competitive advantage and uses the identified criteria to rate SFU against its 
competitors such as University of British Columbia (UBC), University of Victoria 
(UVIC), University of Northern British Columbia (UNBC) and the University Colleges. 
Following the internal and external analyses, the next section discusses and 
describes fully disruptive innovation and the impact that technology is having on online 
education.  The discussion covers online education, in particular the rise of MOOCs, and 
why MOOCs are disruptive and a threat.   
The Blue Ocean Strategy is then introduced as a model to implement the 
recommended changes.  The Blue Ocean strategy represents an analytical framework for 
firms to use when searching for new and untapped markets.  Use of the model will help to 
stimulate people into action and for that reason is the recommended model for developing 
and implementing the strategic option in this paper.   
In the strategic analysis section of this paper, three strategic alternatives are 
presented and reviewed with the objective of selecting the model that best helps improve 
SFU’s overall strategic position. The analysis will conclude with a recommendation (a 
strategic option) that will improve SFU’s value proposition and address the mounting 
questions surrounding the actual quality and value that universities provide to students 
and the society.  
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2: Organization’s Current Position 
This section provides an overview of SFU, specifically who it is and what it does 
followed by SFU’s current strategic position.  SFU’s goals, product market focus, value 
proposition, and core activities are identified, and how SFU enhances its position through 
brand recognition and differentiation strategy is explained.  Next, the discussion 
highlights SFU’s current performance in the areas of finance, enrolment, research, 
endowment and online education to identify possible issues of relevance.  Finally, the 
section ends by identifying the key issues that could significantly influence SFU’s current 
operations. 
2.1 Organization Overview - Simon Fraser University 
Founded in 1965 with its first campus located atop Burnaby Mountain near 
Vancouver, B.C., SFU is one of Canada’s leading post-secondary comprehensive 
universities.  SFU has grown from its charter class of 2,500 to over 35,000 students in 
2011/12 (roughly 86% undergraduate and 14% graduate), and presently offers more than 
100 undergraduate and graduate degree programs.  In addition, through its Lifelong 
Learning Area, SFU also provides adult education and non-credit programs. 
SFU has three campuses, all located in the Lower Mainland.  The Burnaby 
campus is the largest, and is home to seven of the eight academic faculties, as well as 
offices for Graduate Studies and Student Services, SFU’s senior executives, 
administrative support units (such as Finance, HR, IT and Facilities) and ancillary 
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services (such as Residences and Housing, and Food Services).  SFU’s downtown 
Vancouver campus houses the Faculty of Contemporary Arts, Communication and 
Technology and the Lifelong Learning Area.  The Surrey campus offers undergraduate 
and graduate programs in Applied Sciences, Arts and Social Sciences, Business 
Administration, Communication, Art and Technology, Education, and Science, and a 
variety of Continuing Studies programs. 
The Beedie School of Business, known for its innovative approaches and delivery 
of meaningful research and teaching, offers undergraduate and professional graduate 
programs.  The school has placed well in various business school rankings, including the 
IS Research Ranking (Venkatesh, 2012) and the UTD Top 100 World Rankings of 
Business Schools Based on Research Contribution 2008-2012. (Naveen School of 
Managment, University of Texas at Dallas, 2013) 
2.2 Current Strategic Position 
A practical model described in Chapter 2, eighth edition of the book, Strategic 
Analysis and Action (Crossan, Rouse, Fry, & Killing, 2013), identifies four related 
components when developing a strategy - Goals, Product Market Focus, Value 
Proposition and Core Activities. These four components will demonstrate SFU’s current 
strategic position.  
2.2.1 Goals 
SFU’s strategic vision statement is one that reflects its strengths and enhances its 
reputation as an institution that is student-centred, research-driven and community-
engaged.  SFU’s vision is “to be the leading engaged university, defined by its dynamic 
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2.2.2 Product Market Focus – Customer and Product Segments 
SFU provides undergraduate and graduate education to domestic Canadian and 
international students and non-credit education to those seeking continuing education or 
lifelong learning.  The table below identifies SFU’s customer and product segments.   
Table:  1. Customer and Product Segments 
Products and/or Services Specific Markets - Customers 
Undergraduate Degree Programs Postsecondary domestic & international students 
Graduate Master Degree Programs Graduate domestic & international students  
PhD Degree Programs Domestic and international students seeking 
Masters and PhD degrees 
Professional Graduate Programs  Lifelong mature adult learners 
Non-Credit Programs For people looking for professional 
development, general interest or to improve their 
2nd language skills 
Certificate & Diploma Programs (i.e. SFU 
offers 27 certificate and diploma 
programs) 
Lifelong mature adult learners.  For people 
looking for professional development or 
continuing education 
 
According to the table below, SFU students (customers) come from a number of 
sources. Seventy-two percent of SFU customers come from Grade 12 of B.C. public 
schools (40%) or transfer from other B.C. colleges (32%).   
Table:  2. Customer Segments (by percentage) 
 Customer Segments Percentage 
 Grade 12 40% 
 College Transfer 32% 
 Non High School 10% 
 Degree Holder 8% 
 University Transfer 5% 
 Mature 1% 
 Other 4% 
Source: Adapted from Spring 2012 UG Enrolment report ST-11 (2011/12 New Undergraduate Headcount 
by Basis of Admission (total 6,807) (SFU - Student Services, 2012) 
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2.2.3 Value Proposition (Benefits) 
SFU’s value proposition is based on Choice, Experience and Community (Dalton, 
2012). 
At SFU students have the choice of distinctive programs, such as criminology, 
environmental toxicology and actuarial science and innovative niche programs in 
business such as the Master of Science in Finance with specializations in either 
Investment or Risk Management, and the Master of Technology MBA.  With SFU’s 
unique tri-semester system, undergraduate students can take courses year round and can 
also choose when (which semester, days, and in some cases evenings and weekends) they 
take their courses and at which campus (SFU - Student Services, 2012). 
SFU offers over 100 programs in eight faculties and is known for its ground 
breaking interdisciplinary approach that lets students pick their pathways and explore 
different subjects.  For example, incoming students do not have to immediately declare a 
major; instead, they can spend the first year taking various courses until they find the 
right program. Students can also choose a major and minor from different faculties. They 
can explore a variety of learning experiences from Co-op work programs and the 
Undergraduate Semester in Dialogue to international exchanges with overseas 
universities.  SFU has agreements with approximately 130 other universities for student 
exchanges in over 45 countries (SFU - Student Services, 2012). 
SFU provides students with a supportive community atmosphere and responsive 
customer service.  SFU is there to help students with their careers and prepare them for 
life (Dalton, 2012). This is particularly useful given that 61% of SFU students are 
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employed while attending school and 26% work more than 20 hours per week (SFU - 
Student Services, 2012). 
2.2.4 Core Activities 
The core activities that enable SFU to deliver the value proposition are: research 
(knowledge creation) and teaching (knowledge distribution); fundraising and investment 
in faculties, laboratories, equipment and technology, libraries and student residences; 
financial assistance, student bursaries and awards; and student services, such as academic 
advising, health and career counseling, and responsive customer service.   
2.2.5 Strategy Statement 
The strategy statement encompasses the four strategy components identified 
above (Crossan, Rouse, Fry, & Killing, 2013, pp. 32-34).  Using the four components, 
SFU’s strategy statement can be summarized as follows:  SFU is one of Canada’s leading 
comprehensive universities providing undergraduate and graduate education to domestic 
and international students by giving them the knowledge and skills needed to prepare 
them for life, in an organizational environment that is rich in fundamental research and 
which provides strong ties to our community. 
2.3 Differentiation versus Cost 
In B.C. universities do not use a cost leadership strategy to differentiate 
themselves.  This is probably because of the government-imposed tuition caps.  Instead, 
universities seeking a competitive advantage employ a differentiation strategy.  For 
example, the Beedie School of Business’ strategy is innovation.  The focus is on 
innovative “niche” programs targeting very specific markets (economies of scope) where 
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competitors are weaker.  Further, since graduate professional programs are higher margin 
premium fee programs, students perceive the higher tuition fees as having added benefit.   
When using a differentiation strategy, brand and reputation are critical.  Two ways 
that universities can enhance brand and reputation are through university rankings and 
accreditation.   
2.3.1 Brand - University Rankings 
University rankings such as Maclean’s University Rankings raise brand and 
reputational awareness and, therefore, serve as a good marketing tool for potential 
students.  According to Maclean’s University Rankings, universities in Canada fall into 
three main categories: Medical Doctoral (UBC), Comprehensive (SFU, UVIC) and 
Primarily Undergraduate (UNBC) and are ranked according to “differences in the levels 
of research funding, the diversity of offerings and the breadth and depth of graduate and 
professional programs” (Coates & Morrison, 2013, p. 88).  In Maclean’s best overall 
national reputational category that considers highest quality, most innovative and leaders 
of tomorrow, SFU ranked 7th out of 49 universities reviewed for 2012.  SFU also ranked 
1st in the Comprehensive category (Maclean's Magazine, 2012, p. 106).  
2.3.2 Brand - Accreditation 
Accreditation at the University, Faculty, Department, and Program levels plays a 
significant role in higher education.  It is perceived as a stamp of quality and helps to 
market the differentiated offerings.  For example, SFU’s Beedie School of Business is 
one of a select group of business schools globally (less than 1%) that is accredited by 
both the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) and the 
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European Quality Improvement System (EQUIS).  SFU is the first and only international 
university to be an accredited member of the largest athletic association in the U.S., the 
NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association).  This differentiates SFU from other 
Canadian and B.C. universities and helps with the recruitment of athletes from the U.S. to 
SFU.  Finally, SFU is pursuing full accreditation status with NWCCU (Northwest 
Commission on Colleges and Universities). If obtained, SFU will be the first university 
outside the U.S. to have achieved NWCCU accreditation. 
2.4 Organizational Structure & Current Performance 
SFU is a functional bureaucracy with a senior management team.  Under the 
President, there are six Vice-Presidents: Academic, Finance and Administration, 
Research, Advancement, External Relations and Legal Affairs.  Executive decision-
making is centralized, however budgetary responsibility is decentralized and the 
University’s budget is distributed based on the size of each of the Vice-President’s 
portfolios.  In total, as at September 30, 2011, there were 2,686 continuing employees 
(1,741 continuing support staff and 945 faculty members) (SFU-Institutional Research 
and Planning, 2011) supporting the various Vice-President portfolios.   SFU’s senior 
administrative structure is shown in the figure below. 
  
Figur
Source
vario
from 
AVE
assign
and v
tuitio
inves
to pro
direct
e 2. SFU S
: (SFU - Senio
SFU, like 
us governme
the B.C. Mi
D allocates 
ed enrolme
arious non-g
n fees, ancil
tment return
vide a balan
ly to those s
enior Admi
r Administrat
its industry 
nt agencies
nistry of Ad
grant fundin
nt targets.  C
overnment 
lary service
s.  As a pub
ced operati
tandards/re
nistrative St
ive Structure, 2
competitors
 – with appr
vanced Edu
g based on p
onsiderable
research gra
s (e.g. reside
lic post-seco
ng budget.   
strictions req
12
ructure 
013) 
, receives th
oximately h
cation, Inno
erformance
 additional 
nts.  The re
nces, books
ndary instit
Therefore, S
uired by AV
e majority o
alf of its ann
vation and T
 as compare
funding com
maining fun
tore), donat
ution, SFU 
FU's goals 
ED for the
f its funding
ual funding
echnology 
d with gove
es from fed
ding source
ions, endow
is required b
support and
 post‐second
 from 
 coming 
(AVED).  
rnment-
eral grants, 
s are from 
ments, and 
y legislation
 contribute 
ary 
 
 
  13
education system in British Columbia. SFU’s annual operating budget, approved by the 
Board of Governors, for fiscal 2012/13 was $448 million.   
2.4.1 Performance – Financial 
There are a number of external governmental decisions that not only affect SFU’s 
ability to control rising costs but also hinder investment in new initiatives.  Some of those 
governmental decisions are: (SFU-Finance, 2012) 
 Annual tuition fee increases capped at 2%.  The cap applies to domestic, 
international and graduate professional fee programs. 
 Stagnant FTE grant funding.  
 Reduction in provincial funding for capital maintenance (from $6M to $500K 
over the last several years). 
 $50M removed from the post-secondary sector in the 2012 Provincial Budget 
Speech (reductions to be phased in over three years) (Steffenhagen, 2012). 
The direct impact of these governmental decisions, identified in the examples 
below, clearly demonstrate the financial constraints currently faced by SFU.  In the 
absence of a significant change in government funding and tuition policy, SFU’s ability 
to continue operating as it has been is questionable (SFU-Finance, 2012). 
 Increasing Deferred Maintenance Costs – Many of SFU’s campus facilities are over 
45 years old and in need of repair and/or upgrade.  This impacts functionality, 
reliability and energy efficiency.  
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 Space Availability - The increases in undergraduate and graduate enrolment and 
support staff (faculty and staff) have grown faster than the space available at the 
three campuses. 
 Rising IT Infrastructure Costs – Along with technological advances comes 
increasing pressure to advance SFU’s IT infrastructure capabilities. 
 SFU’s defined benefits pension plan for the Administrative/Union employee groups 
is no longer sustainable.  According to SFU’s Annual Report dated March 31, 2012, 
“The December 31, 2010 actuarial valuation noted a $16.3M going concern 
unfunded liability and a $64M solvency deficit” (SFU-Finance, 2012, p. 27).  
2.4.2 Performance - Domestic and International Student Enrolment  
SFU’s overall enrolment has been increasing steadily over the last five years (up 
18%) helped largely by increasing international enrolments.  International student 
enrolment accounts for approximately 18% of SFU’s total enrolment (SFU-Finance, 
2012).  
The significant growth in international enrolments is due in part to SFU’s 
agreement with Fraser International College (FIC).  FIC, located adjacent to SFU’s 
Burnaby Campus, acts as a feeder school to SFU for international students.  In addition to 
increased international enrolments, SFU also receives revenues from FIC (SFU-Finance, 
2012).  The projected Gross Revenues for fiscal 2013/14 from FIC to SFU are expected 
to total $9.5M.   
For the fiscal year ending March 31, 2012, international enrolments were 1,621, 
exceeding the original target of 927 students or 17.5% of domestic students (SFU-
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Finance, 2012).  This growth has both positive and negative implications. The over-
enrolment has impacted SFU’s ability to provide sufficient course accessibility and 
availability and, increases instructional and operational support costs.  However, the 
higher international tuition fees do help alleviate some of SFU’s financial and budgetary 
constraints. 
SFU’s domestic enrolment has risen over the years and continues to rise (0.1% 
increase expected over 2011/12) however the aging population in Canada has changed 
the demographics.  According to a University Affairs article dated May 26, 2011, 
 “The number of Canadians aged 18 to 21 peaked this year.  Students within this 
age group now comprise 52 percent of full-time enrolment. Over the next decade the 
population in this age group will decline by about 10%.” (Association of Universities and 
Colleges of Canada (AUCC) , 2011, p. 24)  
The number of post-secondary school age population (age 18-24 years) is also 
expected to decline (SFU-Finance, 2012). 
SFU’s heavy reliance on tuition revenues generated from domestic undergraduate 
students in the 18 to 24 year old age range presents a financial risk to SFU.  The 
projected decline of that age group in the absence of any change by the institution, will 
significantly affect domestic tuition revenues.  In addition, since government funding is 
based on enrolment targets, a decline in domestic enrolments would result in an 
associated drop in funded government FTE enrolments.  The problem is not unique to 
SFU.  In an AUCC’s University Affairs article “Trends in Higher Education”, the 
authors’ state: 
“The population in Canada over the age of 65 will double by 2030, while the 
working age (25-64) population will grow by eight percent”. The authors go on to state 
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that “Universities will need to respond to the anticipated economic, social and labour 
market demands by expanding access to higher education for untapped segments of the 
population and international students, and increase the quality of the education students 
receive.” 
The authors close by suggesting that the quality of university education can be 
enhanced by providing, “more interactive and engaging learning experiences.” 
(Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) , 2011, p. 5) 
2.4.3 Performance – Online  
SFU’s use of online instructional course delivery is limited.  SFU does offer 
online and distance education through the Centre for Online and Distance Education 
(CODE) in Lifelong Learning, up to 100 courses each term (SFU - CODE, 2013).  
Roughly, 10% of SFU courses are offered online, with no complete degree programs.  
Technology is changing rapidly in the area of online course delivery as seen with 
the rise of MOOCs.  Many Canadian universities (i.e. Athabasca, Royal Roads) are also 
using technology to develop alternate instructional formats to improve their offerings, in 
an effort to provide students with more flexible learning options and as a way to 
differentiate themselves and enhance their individual brands.  These strategies by other 
universities create uncertainty surrounding SFU’s continued ability to attract students in 
the future.  
SFU has choices.  SFU can continue to view online course delivery as simply an 
additional service provided to existing students, or as an opportunity to do two things: 
provide existing students with a more interactive and engaging learning experiences and 
target a new market of students (current non-customers).  In the long run, however, 
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changing technologies and greater demand for online course delivery will affect how 
SFU delivers courses in the future and this will impact the way in which professors teach. 
2.4.4 Performance - Research 
In the area of research, SFU has enjoyed significant growth and SFU’s research 
activities represent a major strength to the institution in terms of research funding and 
reputation.  Between 1999 and 2011, SFU’s research income expanded fourfold.  
According to SFU’s Vice-President Research Office (January 28, 2013), in fiscal 2012, 
SFU’s funding for research activities expanded by 6% to $95.6M putting it within easy 
reach of its 2013 target to make the “100 million club”.  Over three-quarters of SFU’s 
sponsored research comes from the federal government (through the Tri-Council, 
Canadian Foundation for Innovation and other sources) (SFU-Finance, 2012).   
Success in securing research funding is heavily dependent on SFU’s reputation 
and ability to attract high profile researchers such as Dr. Robert Young, SFU’s Merck 
Frosst B.C. Leadership) Chair in Pharmaceutical Genomics in Drug Discovery (with 
support from Leading Edge Endowment Fund).  Dr. Young is credited with having 
developed the asthma drug SingulairTM at Merck Frosst.  Today, SingulairTM is used 
worldwide in treating adult and childhood asthma and allergic rhinitis (hay fever) (LEEF: 
Leading Edge Endowment Fund, 2008).  
2.4.5 Performance – Endowment 
The income generated on endowments received via a university’s fundraising 
efforts can be material, depending on the individual university’s brand, reputation and 
fundraising abilities.  Since endowed funds are invested in capital markets, income 
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generated is highly impacted by changes in interest rates and the strength of the economy.  
For example, endowments in Canada and the U.S. suffered significant income reductions 
and value losses due to the recession and market decline of 2008.  The ongoing market 
volatility continues to threaten the annual amount of endowment income that is available 
for spending allocations (SFU-Finance, 2012, p. 27). 
2.5 Current Strategic Issues 
Change, when it occurs, is driven by the government’s university funding formula 
(i.e. resulting from a change in political party or if another university is built).  SFU is 
shielded somewhat from many of the external market forces and enjoys stability because 
of its governmental sponsorship.  However, since the majority of SFU funding originates 
from government, there is a strong emphasis on satisfying government, and SFU policies 
are set up in accordance with governmental guidelines.  Since not all funding originates 
from government, SFU is also dependent on attracting domestic and international 
students, and as such, competes directly with the other post-secondary institutions in B.C. 
and other parts of Canada.   
This strategic analysis will attempt to address some of the conditions that could 
severely affect SFU’s current operations:   
 Mounting questions surrounding the actual quality and value that universities 
provide to students and the society as a whole (SFU - Vice–President Academic 
Office, 2013).  
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 Rising demands by government, parents and students to provide more skills-based 
programs that better prepare students for jobs available in the economy (SFU - 
Vice–President Academic Office, 2013). 
 The sustainability of the traditional university’s’ business model resulting from 
changing technologies, ever-increasing salary and operational costs, declining 
facilities, and greater demand for more interactive and engaging learning 
experiences (such as those provided with alternative instructional models). 
 Increased competition from within Canada and globally from disruptive 
technologies such as MOOC’s and the increase in the number of universities such as 
Royal Roads and Queens that offer blended programs (alternative instructional 
formats that include both online and face-to-face components in their programs).   
 Uncertainty regarding the impact that the population shift (changing demographics) 
will have on future enrolment. 
 Potential risks associated with a decline in the number of international student 
enrolments resulting from the rise of universities in Asia.  If this happens, SFU will 
have to increase recruitment efforts to attract international students or risk losing 
students to competitors. 
 Course availability, course access, and relevant course options (i.e. attention to 
differences in individual learning styles and preferences). 
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2.6 Internal Analysis Summary & Conclusion 
This section covered SFU’s current position.  The review showed that SFU is a 
well-reputed comprehensive university in Canada that offers students choices of a variety 
of learning experiences and a sense of community.  However, as current observers point 
out, there are a number of external pressures that require attention.  In particular, 
questions arise around the value and quality of education universities provide to students 
and society, the increasing demand for universities to provide more skills-based programs 
and to better address the needs of mature adult learners returning to school later in life.  
Then there are the changing demographics (resulting from an aging population) and the 
risks associated with the potential decline in international student enrolments as the 
number of universities in Asia increases. Finally, and of significant importance, are the 
rapid advances in technology especially in the area of online learning.  
The remaining discussion expands upon and addresses the issues raised in this 
section.  
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3: External Analysis 
In this section, the focus moves outward, looking at the external industry 
environment.  This paper analyzes the publically funded post-secondary education 
industry in B.C., Canada and focuses on B.C. undergraduate and graduate domestic and 
international students.  The analysis will first define the industry and the scope of this 
review followed by the academic value chain.  The value chain is a basic tool for 
diagnosing, creating and maintaining competitive advantage.  Next, the analysis identifies 
customer segments, their willingness to pay for preferences, and the current competitive 
landscape.   
When conducting an industry analysis it is important to look at the structure and 
nature of the competition.  For this Porter’s Five Forces framework is applied to the 
higher educational market to acquire an understanding or snapshot of the competitive 
forces that impact the current players and those considering entering the market.   The 
Five Forces framework will show that the threat of substitutes is particularly relevant. 
The discussion then moves from the current environment to a review of what might 
happen in the industry in the long term.  We look at the political, environmental, social 
and technological factors (PEST) that may affect SFU and the industry in the future. 
Finally, no industry analysis is complete without identifying the sources of advantage 
(SoA) and then comparing those to your competitors.  Specifically, how well SFU and its 
competitors rate on previously identified SoA relative to each other is evaluated. The 
section concludes with the strengths and weaknesses identified in the relative competitive 
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analysis and a synopsis of the threats and opportunities that will enable SFU to take 
actions to improve and strengthen its competitive position. 
3.1 Industry Definition 
According to the Ministry of Advanced Education, universities are degree 
granting publically or privately funded institutions that provide undergraduate and 
graduate education to domestic and international students.  They also offer non-credit 
education to those seeking continuing education or lifelong learning.  These institutions 
may also offer a selection of diploma and certificate programs along with other skill-
based technical programs.  (Ministry of Advanced Education, Innovation and 
Technology, p. 5)  
Post-secondary education in Canada is the responsibility of provincial and 
territorial Governments.  Therefore, each province has its own policies, procedures, laws 
and quality assurance mechanisms that govern how the institutions will operate.  The 
post-secondary education industry in B.C. includes academic, vocational, technical and 
continuing professional education offered by universities, colleges and institutes.  Most 
of the funding for public post-secondary institutions is derived from provincial, or 
territorial budgets and the federal government (e.g. Tri-Council research funding) with 
the balance coming from tuition fees and various private sources (Ministry of Advanced 
Education, Innovation and Technology, p. 7).  Universities are vertically integrated in 
that courses are developed within the particular university, however, some things, such as 
textbooks, are provided from independent suppliers.  They are also highly autonomous.  
For example, they set their own admission standards, program offerings, degree 
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requirements, and oversee the management of their financial affairs (Ministry of 
Advanced Education, Innovation and Technology, p. 9). 
3.2 Value Chain 
The Value Chain is a concept introduced by Harvard Professor Michael Porter. In 
his book Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Porter 
states: 
“The Value Chain is a basic tool for diagnosing competitive advantage and finding 
ways to create and sustain it. The value chain creates a systematic way to divide the firm 
into its discrete activities, and thus can be used to examine how the activities in a firm are 
and could be grouped.” (Porter M. E., 1985, p. 59) 
Using Porter’s Value Chain model, we can apply it to the higher education 
industry to help detect where potential bottlenecks may occur.  For the education 
industry, the product is education and the outcome is student learning. The raw materials 
are the faculty, land, buildings and the customers are the students who select the school 
and pay for the education.  In the higher education industry, the role of faculty is 
instrumental given that they are the ones delivering the product (learning content) 
(Lauridsen, 2011, p. 106).  Faculty members carry out the dual roles of research and 
teaching.    
According to Crossan et al., the value chain should only include those activities 
that are essential in producing a predetermined outcome that adds value.  The objective is 
to examine how each activity contributes to the customer’s (student’s) willingness to pay.  
“The value created, less the costs, dictates the margin, or lack thereof, derived by each 
activity along the value chain.” (Crossan, Rouse, Fry, & Killing, 2013, p. 65)  
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 The figure below shows the Academic Value Chain as depicted by Barbara 
Lauridsen’s paper entitled Shifting the Paradigm. 
Figure 3. Academic Value Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reproduced from: Shifting the Paradigm: Value-Chain Analysis Applied to Online Learning 
(Lauridsen, 2011, p. 106) 
With respect to course development van der Merwe says, 
 “The first step in the process is to identify only the processes responsible 
for or involved in the design and construction of a student’s learning environment. 
The next step is to identify the processes that determine the predefined outcome. 
There are two outcomes in the educational environment, course development and 
course presentation.” (van der Merwe & Cronje, 2004, p. 4) 
Below is education value chain for course development as depicted by van der 
Merwe et al.  The diagram shows that a course cannot be distributed until a student 
registration has been processed.  Furthermore, a course cannot be presented without the 
course first having been developed.  Therefore, course development is embedded within 
course presentation and follows registration:  
“A value chain approach to higher education will go some way towards 
determining those areas of the system where bottlenecks are likely to occur, as well 
as providing a route to follow when determining the value that can be added by 
technology.” (van der Merwe & Cronje, 2004, p. 5) 
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In B.C. there are 25 publically funded institutions consisting of four distinct types 
or strategic groups, each with its own mandates. As shown in the table below, there are 
four research-intensive universities, seven teaching-intensive universities, eleven colleges 
and three provincial institutes.   
Table:  3.  Publically-Funded Educational Institutions 
Research-Intensive Universities 
Simon Fraser University (SFU) University of British Columbia (U.B.C.) 
University of Victoria (UVIC) University of Northern British Columbia 
(UNBC) 
Teaching-Intensive Universities 
Capilano University Emily Carr University of Art and Design 
Kwantelen Polytechnic University Royal Roads University 
Thompson Rivers University (TRU) University of the Fraser Valley 
Vancouver Island University  
Colleges 
Camosun College College of New Caledonia 
College of the Rockies Douglas College 
Langara College Okanagan College 
North Island College Northern Lights College 
Northwest Community College Selkirk College 
Vancouver Community College  
Institutes 
British Columbia Institute of Technology Justice Institute of British Columbia 
Nicola Valley Institute of Technology  
Source: Adapted from Post-Secondary Data – Education Costs (Ministry of Advanced Education, 
Innovation and Technology) 
From the table above, the research-intensive institutions, three in particular, UBC, 
SFU and UVIC receive the largest amount of government funding and have large 
endowment and research funding from which to draw on.  Further, these three 
universities are the only ones in B.C. that offer, in addition to an undergraduate 
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education, a full range of post-graduate degree programs. They also receive significant 
research-related funding.  For students interested in medicine and law there are few 
choices if they wish to study in B.C. UBC, TRU (in collaboration with Calgary) and 
UVIC have law schools, while only UBC has a medical school.  
The table below presents the weighted average tuition paid by students in each of 
the four public instructional groupings. 
Table:  4. Public Instructional Groups 
Institution 2011/12 Tuition 2012/13 Tuition % Increase 
Research $4,735 $4,830 2% 
Teaching $3,824 $3,900 2% 
Colleges $2,647 $3,700 2% 
Institutes $4,827 $4,926 2% 
System Weighted Average $4,004 $4,008  
Source: Reproduced from Post-Secondary Data – Education Costs (Ministry of Advanced Education, 
Innovation and Technology, pp. 1-3) 
3.4 Customers - Segments 
Customers for the purposes of this analysis are post-secondary individuals pursing 
undergraduate (baccalaureate) or graduate degrees.  The undergraduate segment includes 
post-secondary domestic and international students and the graduate segment includes 
those pursuing a graduate degree.  An example of a professional graduate program in the 
Beedie School of Business is the Executive Masters in Business Administration (EMBA).   
3.4.1 Why the distinction matters 
Customer preferences or willingness to pay criteria, for the purposes of this 
analysis, falls into five broad categories: cost, university location/convenience (proximity 
to home), university brand/reputation, range of product offering, and student experience.  
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These categories are important to both undergraduate and graduate students segments but 
to varying degrees of importance.  For example, PhD students when choosing a 
university are primarily interested in cost, available funding, brand (academic reputation), 
specific program offering in their chosen area of specialization and reputation of the 
supervisor.  Undergraduate students primarily choose a university based on proximity to 
home.   Further on in this analysis, in the section on Customer Utility Advantage, the five 
categories making up the customer preferences are broken down and ranked. 
There are also demographic differences.  For example, the demographics of the 
MBA and EMBA professional graduate programs in business are quite varied.  In the 
MBA program, there are usually more international students.  The candidates are younger 
and have as little as two years’ work experience.  These students have completed their 
undergraduate degree and have decided to go directly to graduate school.  The EMBA 
program targets older candidates with six to ten years of work experience who work full-
time.  These students reside in B.C. and work and study at the same time.  Therefore, it is 
important, when considering the value proposition to understand the differences between 
and within the segments.  Appendix A provides additional information regarding SFU’s 
EMBA program and the EMBA industry analysis, including the Maclean’s EMBA 
Rankings and EMBA competitive market in B.C. The table below shows a side-by-side 
comparison between typical undergraduate students and graduate EMBA students.  
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Table:  5. Undergraduate and Graduate EMBA Professional Segments 
Undergraduate Students Graduate Professional - EMBA 
Typically young 18-24 year olds seeking 
an UG degree 
Older, mid-career professionals who already 
hold a UG degree 
May/May not still live at home Generally do not live at home 
Study full time and work part time Work full time, study part time 
May/may not know upon entry what they 
would like to study 
Chosen to pursue an advanced degree (EMBA) 
to provide additional career options 
Value student campus community, 
experience important 
Value program content and networking 
opportunities are important 
3.5 Five Forces Framework 
Regarding the five forces analysis, Crossan et al. state:  
“Understanding industry structure is the starting point for strategic analysis and 
strategy formulation.  Examining five forces helps organizations understand how value that 
is create by companies, is actually captured by the industry players.” (Crossan, Rouse, 
Fry, & Killing, 2013, p. 60) 
Porter’s Five Forces framework is a way to evaluate a firm’s position compared to 
the overall industry in which it operates. We will use Porter’s Five Forces framework 
(Porter M. E., 2008, p. 4) to help determine the long run profitability of the higher 
education industry and the nature of the competition.  The five forces that shape 
competition are: rivalry among existing competition, threat of new entrants, threat of 
substitute products or services, bargaining power of suppliers and bargaining power of 
buyers (customers).   
The exhibit below is extracted from Chapter 2 of Pankaj Ghemawat’s book 
entitled: Strategy and the Business Landscape.  The exhibit reproduces Porter’s Five 
Forces Framework for Industry Analysis showing the influences (factors) that Porter 
flagged as relevant for each of the forces (Ghemawat, 2010, p. 23).  
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Figure 6. Porter’s Five Forces – Post-Secondary Educational Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5.1 Rivalry among Existing Competition 
Competitive rivalry within an industry comes from existing competition. 
According to Porter, “the degree to which rivalry drives down an industry’s profit 
potential depends first on intensity with which companies compete and, second, on the 
basis on which they compete.” (Porter M. E., 2008, p. 9) 
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Education Institutions 
 
 
 
Suppliers 
(High Power) 
 
 Faculty 
 Administrators 
 Operations 
 Technology  
Threat of Substitutes 
(Moderate and growing) 
 
 Online Degrees  
 MOOC’s 
 For Profit Universities 
 Universities outside B.C. 
Buyers 
(Moderate Power) 
 
 Students 
 Parents 
 Companies 
(industry) 
Potential New Entrants 
(Low Threat) 
 
 New Institutions 
 International Institutions 
 Duplicate offerings 
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According to James Pringle and Jeroen Huisman, in higher education, the 
intensity of rivalry depends on the object of the competition: students, faculty, research 
money, donor contributions and government funding.  The more similar the universities 
are in one region, the greater the rivalry between them. Rivalry will increase if 
institutions are of roughly equal size and provide similar programs.  The reason is that 
there are more providers competing for the same student segments and inputs including 
faculty and programs (Pringle & Huisman, 2011, p. 50). 
In B.C., universities seeking competitive advantage employ a differentiation 
strategy.  The newer smaller known universities (university colleges) attract students who 
are looking for skills-based programs or those searching for an undergraduate degree 
offered in a smaller institutional setting.  The university colleges act as feeder schools to 
the larger established universities.  The larger established universities have the advantage 
of attracting students looking for knowledge, brand reputation, program specialization 
(i.e. law, medicine, criminology) and those interested in pursuing graduate and post-
graduate studies not offered by university colleges.   
The extent of price competiveness depends on growth, number of competitors, 
differentiation and fixed costs. The intensity of rivalry within the industry is low to 
moderate.  The criteria used to rank the intensity of rivalry within the industry are 
presented in the table below. 
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Table:  6. Rivalry Criteria 
Factor Criteria Reviewed Impact 
Growth 
demand 
The number of K-12 students is flattening and is expected to 
remain so for the next 10 years therefore high rivalry (institutions 
competing for students).  Rivalry is always more intense when 
markets are stagnating. 
High 
Low price 
differentiation 
Schools cannot lower the price to win business so institutions do 
not compete on price.  Note: The Government has capped tuition 
rate increases (currently at 2%) 
Low 
Product 
Differentiation 
Schools in B.C. are diffentiated by location.  (i.e. UVIC is in a 
better position to compete for students in Victoria than SFU) 
Location (proximity to student) is an important factor in many 
school choice decisions therefore these schools are naturally 
differentiated.    
High 
Number of 
competitors in 
the market 
There are 25 publically funded institutions in B.C. (see table 3)  
The greater the concentration the lower the rivalry.  
Low 
Capacity 
utilization 
The institutions are required to operate at full or near capacity 
(funded FTE) to achieve competitive economies of scale 
therefore high rivalry.    
High 
Cost structure 
(fixed costs) 
Significant portion of the costs incurred are fixed. Exceedingly 
high fixed cost (salaries, advanced technology, capital 
infrastructure) to total cost ratio.   
High 
Exit barriers The costs associated with exiting the industry are high.  This 
increases the intensity of the competition. 
High 
3.5.2 Threat of Entry 
According to Porter, “entry barriers are advantages that incumbents have relative 
to new entrants.” (Porter M. E., 2008, p. 3)  For example, in the past, the B.C. colleges 
presented a threat of entry to the existing four-year degree-granting universities. Some 
B.C. colleges finally succeeded in becoming universities and obtaining degree-granting 
status. The potential for entry into the higher education market depends on a number of 
factors: economies of scale, capital requirements, brand identity, buyer resistance to 
switch, and government policy.  In addition, the transportation infrastructure also affects 
access to higher education.  Students want easy access to classes.  Those universities that 
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are close to transportation routes have a competitive advantage over those that are not.  
Therefore, distribution channels present a strong barrier for new entrants that do not have 
access to comprehensive public transportation systems (Pringle & Huisman, 2011, p. 44 
& 45). 
  The threat of new entrants (new institutions, international institutions, duplicate 
offerings) is low (high barrier, low entry threat).  The criteria used to rank the threat of 
new entrants are shown in the table below (Pringle & Huisman, 2011). 
Table:  7. Threat of New Entrants Criteria 
Factor Criteria Reviewed Impact 
Incumbency 
advantage 
(Investment 
Costs) 
The original three established institutions (UBC, SFU, UVIC) 
have large endowments, large facilities (high capital 
requirements) and grounds, brand recognition, alumnae base, 
established faculty, political connections and an age legacy.  
Further, the funding required to support the faculties, land & 
buildings suggests large economies of scale and therefore entry 
barriers.  The other institutions also have this advantage but to 
a smaller degree. 
High 
Barrier, 
low entry 
Restrictive 
Government 
policy 
The provincial government constricts the number of entrants.  
Post-secondary institutions in B.C. receive about 50% of their 
operating budget from the Provincial Government.  Funding is 
allocated based on the approved number of seats a particular 
institution has been awarded.   
High 
Barrier, 
low entry 
Accreditation 
requirements 
and restrictions 
Those universities or schools (Business, Law, Medical, 
Engineering) that are accredited provide an entry barrier due to 
the onerous process and continuing requirements that 
accreditation bodies impose to first become and then remain 
accredited.   
High 
Barrier, 
low entry 
3.5.3 Threat of Substitutes 
According to Porter, a substitute performs the same or a similar function by a 
different means (Porter M. E., 2008, p. 8).  Substitutes for the industry include: 
organizations outside of the higher education industry, such as employer in-house on-the-
job training, training companies, and corporate universities and online programs.  
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Substitutes also include universities outside B.C.  These would be a very strong substitute 
for international students.  
According to Martinez & Wolverton, identifying substitutes for existing higher 
education services entails a review of the learning experience. By using three attributes: 
time, convenience and application (application-based research rather than traditional 
theory-based research), one can determine the legitimacy of a particular substitute 
(Martinez & Wolverton, 2009, p. 27 & 28). 
Table:  8. Threat of Substitutes  
Factors Examples 
Time Time is considered the most important factor driving students to seek out 
substitutes. Students are looking for options that decrease the completion 
time for a degree (i.e. at Royal Roads one can complete an UG degree in 2 
years). 
 
Seminar and Training companies have found ways to shorten the time needed 
to obtain certain skills and knowledge by creating one to five day modular 
programs.  
Convenience As the number of mature adult learners increases, programs offered online 
(module offerings over the internet), for days, at evenings, or at weekends 
become more appealing. Mobile technology allows “learn anywhere, 
anytime” capacity.   
Application Relevance of the traditional university degree.  More and more students are 
questioning the value of the traditional theory based instruction and are 
demanding more relevant application based instruction. Students are looking 
for programs that will lead to jobs.  Application based instruction may be 
considered a substitute to traditional theory based instruction. 
 
According to Martinez & Wolverton, “competitors that offer substitutes often 
combine time, convenience and application because of expanded delivery options made 
possible by technology.”  They go on to point out that “often today’s substitutes become 
major industry players tomorrow and hold the potential to redefine the industry.” 
(Martinez & Wolverton, 2009, p. 28)  We only have to consider the rapid rise of MOOCs 
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and the attention placed on online learning in 2012 to understand that the industry is 
changing. 
Based on the three factors noted in the table above, the threat of substitutes, in this 
case MOOCs and online learning is moderate and growing.  
3.5.4 Bargaining Power of Buyers  
The amount of buyer power is determined by the level of ability that buyers have 
to exert pressure, to either drive down prices or increase the quality of the product for the 
same price (Porter M. E., 2008, p. 7 & 8). The major buyers in the higher education 
industry are the domestic B.C. students, international (mainly Asian) students and their 
parents.  Buyers also include companies and executives in industry. The assigned ranking 
for buyer power is moderate to high.  
Even though students are not able to negotiate on tuition rates or admission 
requirements, they can easily switch institutions if unsatisfied with the current institution 
that they are in.  B.C. has an extremely flexible transfer credit policy facilitated by 
BCCAT (B.C. Council on Admissions and Transfer).  However, when compared to 
supplier power, student power is weaker, the reason being that buyers act as individuals 
when choosing their particular university while the suppliers or faculty operate as a 
collective.  The table below presents the criteria used to rank the bargaining power of 
buyers within the industry. 
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Table:  9. Bargaining Power of Buyers Criteria 
Factor Criteria Reviewed Impact 
The cost of 
switching 
Easy to switch to another university. In B.C. there is 
considerable flexibility in routes to a credential and 
students can easily transfer between institutions. 
Moderate 
to High 
Size of Buyers 
relative to Sellers 
Much smaller – each buyer is infinitesimal % of sellers’ 
revenues 
Low 
Price sensitivity Price sensitivity is inversely related to how important 
the quality of the seller’s product is to the buyer and 
positively related to how much of the buyer’s total costs 
the seller’s product represents.  Students choose whether 
or not they want to pay the price.   
High 
Ability to backward 
integrate 
If the ability to backward integrate (threat to buy rivals 
product) is yes then buyer power is increased.  There are 
several degree granting institutions in B.C. therefore 
buyers can choose where to take their courses 
Moderate 
to High 
Number of domestic 
buyers 
Number of domestic buyers from K-12 is flattening.   High 
Relative 
concentration or 
fragmentation of 
buyers 
Buyers are highly fragmented, Low buyer concentration, 
hence low power 
Low 
3.5.5 Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
According to Porter, supplier power is strong if the supplier (faculty) offers 
differentiated products (for example, law, medicine, actuarial science), buyers (students) 
face switching costs, there are no substitutes for what the suppliers (faculty) provide and 
if the power is more concentrated than the industry that it sells to (students) (Porter M. E., 
2008, p. 6 & 7). The assigned bargaining power of suppliers is high. 
In the higher education industry, the suppliers are the highly skilled instructors, 
researchers and administrators, and a significant portion of the university’s budget 
supports the associated labour costs. University support services such as the bookstore, 
food services and residences also provide a source of supplier power but to a lesser 
degree than those of the faculty and administrators.  In the higher education industry the 
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product is education and is provided by skilled instructors who hold the bulk of the 
supplier power.  In the instructional area faculty are specifically recruited for their 
research and instruction-specific expertise.  Faculty members are highly specialized, 
highly educated, and work with great independence and autonomy. Tenured faculty 
members have job security (positions guaranteed for life), and recruitment and 
replacement costs are high.  Faculty members directly affect the institution’s end product 
(student learning) and therefore affect the reputation of the institutions that they work for.  
Therefore, they are crucial to providing customer value and hence the bargaining power 
of suppliers is high.  
The table below presents the criteria used to rank the bargaining power of 
suppliers within the industry. 
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Table:  10. Bargaining Power of Suppliers Criteria 
Factor Criteria Reviewed Impact 
Switching costs In B.C. there is considerable flexibility in routes to 
a credential and students can easily transfer 
between institutions. However, students are tied to 
their institutions through the networks they have 
developed and are reluctant to move to an 
institution that is not in close proximity to home. 
Low 
Relative concentration or 
fragmentation of suppliers 
High supplier concentration, low fragmentation, 
hence high power 
High 
Ability to forward integrate Faculty are highly specialized in their area of 
expertise and are required by the nature of tenure to 
continue to perform research in their respective 
fields.  
High 
Importance of suppliers’ 
product quality to quality of 
school’s product 
Faculty members directly impact the institutions 
end product (student learning) and therefore affect 
the reputation of the institutions that they work for. 
High 
3.6 PEST 
Use of the PEST (political, economic, social, technological) analysis method 
provides insight into upcoming industry trends.  Crossan et al. state: 
“These forces can be viewed as more macro in orientation than Porter’s five forces 
and in many respects are the early warning signals about changes in the industry.  The 
PEST forces impact the micro forces of supply, competition and demand.” (Crossan, 
Rouse, Fry, & Killing, 2013, p. 70) 
The PEST analysis helps us understand the factors that will affect SFU and the 
industry in the future.  This will help to identify the threats and opportunities.  SFU can 
then take advantage of the opportunities and mitigate the threats. 
3.6.1 Political 
In the higher education industry, governmental policies are a powerful driver.  As 
governments attempt to balance their finances, universities should prepare for further 
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reductions in base funding transfers. As noted in the Threat of Entry section, universities 
receive a significant portion of their funding from government therefore any reduction in 
the level of funding will have significant effect on a university’s ability to operate. To 
remain competitive, universities will have to find alternative revenue sources and 
improve efficiencies in course delivery (i.e. combine online with face-to-face instruction 
to improve customer experience and learning outcomes).   
3.6.2 Economical 
There is rising criticism that universities are not providing students with the skills 
necessary to get jobs (Coates & Morrison, 2013, p. 43). This impacts not only the 
students but society as well.  In addition, student debt is increasing and students are 
questioning the value they are getting from their degrees.  Many students now have to 
work part-time while going to school.  Further, according Ken Coates and Bill Morrison, 
60% of all graduating students in Canada carry debt with the average amount of $24,600 
(Coates & Morrison, 2013, p. 43).  
Individuals returning to higher education do so to increase their current skills or 
develop new skills, however, due to limited financial resources, these mature students 
seek lower cost options.   
3.6.3 Social 
The demographic make-up of the student body is changing with an increase in the 
number the mature adult learners.  This group wants greater flexibility regarding when 
and how they take their courses.  The increased demand from older age groups is good 
for graduate professional programs such as the EMBA.   While the 18 to 24 year old 
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demographic is declining, participation rates for this age group are rising. Further, 
demand for university graduates is expected to continue as noted in the quote below: 
“based on past labour-market trends and projected population changes, there will 
be close to 1.3 million more jobs for university graduates in 2020 than there were in 2010.  
In addition, there will be approximately 700,000 to 900,000 more jobs for university 
graduates to replace those who will retire over the coming decade.  It is expected that part 
of the growth projected would come from increases in international students.” (Association 
of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) , 2011, p. 57) 
If participation and enrolment rates were to fall for some reason, the declining 
demographic could present a potential threat given that a significant amount of the 
government funding is based on UG full-time equivalents (FTEs).  However, the real 
threat may not be the shrinking of the 18-24 demographic, but rather the shift in what 
students are demanding.  For example, if demand shifted towards the skills-based 
programs such as business and engineering and away from liberal arts and general 
sciences. Universities are slow to change, therefore it is important that universities be 
cognoscente of potential demographic and demand shifts and responds accordingly. 
Further, more and more people are going to school to differentiate themselves and 
want to obtain the skills necessary to get a job.  Customer preferences are changing.  
Students are now more technologically aware and expect online access to professors and 
study groups and access from mobile devices.  The bargaining power of buyers in 
Porter’s Five Forces model is currently moderate, however, with the globalization of 
learning and increasing development of online educational tools, students are no longer 
tied to a particular institution.   
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There has been a huge increase in the growth of international students over the 
last five years.  These student learners want skills that facilitate mobility and 
transferability for the global economy.  This trend is also appearing with domestic 
students who are concerned about marketability.  
There is also uncertainty regarding the continued growth in international student 
enrolments.  The home countries of many of Canada’s international students (e.g. China) 
are committing significant resources to building universities and expanding higher 
education sectors.  This may deter many students from going abroad to study. China is 
also developing programs that cater to Americans and other international students with 
the hopes of attracting a half a million foreign students to China (Chen, 2012, p. B16 & 
B17).  The impact of this is yet unknown.  
3.6.4 Technological 
Applying Porter’s Five Forces to higher education, over time, the power of buyers 
and substitutes can change.  Technology is a powerful driver and the globalization of 
higher education could disrupt the competitive landscape by increasing substitute 
products (i.e. MOOC’s) and lowering the barriers to entry.  In Section 4 of this paper, 
attention is placed on the idea that massive open online courses (MOOCs) are disruptive 
and threatening traditional face-to-face instructional formats.  For example, at the time of 
writing of this paper, the MOOCs phenomenon that has dominated most of the U.S. in 
2012 has now expanded to the U.K. with the Futurlearn consortium in December 2012 
and to continental Europe in March 2013 with the Berlin-based start-up “iversity”.  
Finally, in March 2013, two Canadian universities, University of Toronto and McGill 
joined edX, the Harvard/MIT MOOCs partnership.   
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3.7 Sources of Advantage (SoA) – Cost Advantage 
In Pankaj Ghemawat’s book he raises the concept of a competitive wedge. 
 “A firm is said to have created a competitive advantage over its rivals if it 
has driven a wider wedge between willingness to pay and costs than its competitors 
have achieved.” (Ghemawat, 2010, p. 44)  
Therefore, Sources of Advantage (SoA), commonly known as Key Success 
Factors, can be broken down into cost advantages and customer utility or willingness to 
pay (WTP) advantages.  This part of the paper covers cost advantages.  
To identify cost advantages requires systematically looking at the components of 
the industry’s cost structure and identifying the factors that lead one firm to have lower 
costs than another.  The first step is to identify the cost structure and then explain how 
they are related.  Finally, the cost advantages are rated according to magnitude of cost 
advantage across industry competitors. 
In this section, the important sources of cost advantage are identified, explained 
and rated by importance according to each of the identified sources of advantage.  The 
table below summarizes the nature of the cost advantages.  Unmarked cells indicate that 
there is neither an advantage nor disadvantage.   
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Table:  11. Cost Advantages 
Cost Advantages SFU UVIC UBC Teaching- 
Intensive 
Univ. 
UNBC 
Cost (from least to 
most expensive) 
2 1 3 No data 4 
Scale economies advantaged advantaged advantaged disadvantaged - 
Scope economies advantaged advantaged advantaged disadvantaged - 
Bargaining      
Labour Costs      
Union agreements       
Operational 
Efficiencies  
Cost/Student 1st & 
2nd year class size 
$253.24 $362.48 $279.08 $242.21 $334.19 
Operational 
Efficiencies 
Cost/Student 3st & 
4nd year class size 
$510.58 $712.02 $459.52 $242.21 $752.22 
 
3.7.1 Cost-Operating Expenditures per WFTE Student 
In order to determine the efficiency in providing instruction at a particular 
university, a useful measure is to review the operating expenditures per weighted full-
time-equivalent (WFTE) student. The lower the cost per FTE, the greater the cost 
advantage for that competitor.  The table below, extracted from the 2013 Maclean’s 
University Rankings, presents the operating expenditures per WFTE student. 
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Table:  12. 2013 MacLean’s University Rankings – Operating Exp. Per WFTE 
University Operating expenditures per 
weighted FTE student 
Rank (from most 
efficient to least) 
Simon Fraser University $12,192 2 
University of Victoria $11,732 1 
University of B.C. $13,486 3 
Teaching-Intensive Univ. No data No data 
University of Northern B.C. $14,393 4 
Source: 2013 Maclean’s University Rankings (Maclean's Magazine, 2012, p. 100) 
From the table above, UVIC and SFU are more efficient in providing instruction 
to their students than UBC and UNBC, and therefore they may have a slight cost 
advantage. 
3.7.2 Scale and Scope Economies 
According to the article by Sheets, Crawford & Soares,  
“Many higher education institutions are under considerable pressure to compete 
by adding more course offerings and programs and it becomes difficult to acquire the 
faculty expertise and organizational resources to ensure a high quality in all the program 
offerings. Therefore they can achieve greater economies of scale only by sacrificing 
economies of scope.” (Sheets, Crawford, & Soares, 2012, p. 9) 
Based on the operating expenditures per WFTE student data, there is little 
evidence to support any significant advantages in scope and scale between the different 
universities.  
3.7.3 Bargaining Power 
No one university really has more bargaining power or rather the ability to 
purchase land and buildings cheaper than the other.  All universities probably receive 
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discounts for leasing photocopiers and perhaps the larger the university the better the rate. 
This difference would not be material.  SFU may get a better deal on a parcel of land in 
Surrey than one of the other universities because it already has a campus in Surrey and 
has developed relationships with the local Government. Then again, Kwantlen is located 
in Surrey.  In general, there is probably no advantage for SFU or any university. 
3.7.4 Operational Efficiencies 
One way to review operational efficiency is to look at average undergraduate class 
size, average instructional salary and average instructor teaching (course) load per year. 
The larger the class sizes the lower the instructional cost per student.  Again using the 
2013 Maclean’s University Rankings, the table below presents the average class size for 
first and second year classes and for third and fourth year classes.   In addition, the table 
includes Statistics Canada 2010/11 data on the total teaching staff and average salary of 
full-time teaching staff at Canadian universities and colleges.  
Table:  13. Operational Efficiencies 
Institution Total 
Teach’g 
Staff 
Average 
Salary 
Courses
per 
Year 
1st  & 
2nd  
Year 
Classes 
Cost  
per 
Student* 
3rd  & 
4th  
Year 
Classes 
Cost  
per 
Student* 
SFU 943 $113,654 6 74.8 $253.24 37.1 $510.58 
UVIC 755 $107,657 6 49.5 $362.48 25.2 $712.02 
UBC 2,630 $127,929 6 76.4 $279.08 46.4 $459.52 
Teaching-
Intensive 
Univ. 
(Kwantlen) 
375 $84,774 10 35.0 $242.21 35.0 $242.21 
UNBC 188 $84,416 6 42.1 $334.19 19.4 $725.22 
Source: (Maclean's Magazine, 2012, p. 111) and  (Statistics Canada, 2010/11, pp. 42-46)    
*Note: the cost per student equals the average salary divided by the number of courses per year 
divided by the average class size. 
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The Maclean’s magazine did not provide data on the teaching-intensive 
universities; however, as a group offers smaller class sizes (16-25 at BCIT and A 
maximum of 35 at Kwantlen).  Running smaller classes increases the instructional cost 
per student; however as the table above shows, faculty salaries are lower at the teaching- 
intensive universities than in the large universities thereby offsetting the higher costs. 
Further, teaching loads are higher at the teaching-intensive universities. This too would 
lower the per student instructional cost.  For example, at Kwantlen, “The maximum 
teaching (course) load is restricted to 5 courses per semester; the average is 3 – 4 courses 
per semester” and there are three semesters per year. (Kwantlen Polytechnic University, 
2013).  At SFU, the maximum teaching load for faculty is 4 courses per year and the 
lecturer teaching (course) load is expected to be double that of faculty.  Therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that when looking only at average instructor salary, class size and 
teaching (course) load the teaching-intensive universities are operationally more efficient 
than the other universities.   
Using SFU’s instructional teaching load as a guide (e.g. assuming 6/year), and the 
same criteria, the table above shows that among the universities there are differences in 
operational efficiency.  The table also shows that in the 3rd and 4th years when class 
sizes go down, the instructional cost per student rises for the universities but remains 
constant for the teaching-intensive universities. 
3.8 Sources of Advantage (SoA) - Customer Utility Advantage 
This section identifies and explains the important customer preferences and 
corresponding sources of customer utility or willingness to pay (WTP) advantage for 
undergraduate and graduate students.  The goal is to rank customer preferences 
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previously identified in the customer segment section of the above external industry 
analysis and then explain why they are relevant. The table below lists the main 
customer/student willingness to pay preferences by segment.  
  49
Table:  14. Sources of Advantage (SoA) – Customer Utility 
Customer Preferences (Willingness to Pay Factors) UG 
Importance 
Grad 
Importance 
   
Cost  #1 #1 
Tuition and textbooks High High 
Access to financial aid, scholarships and bursaries High High 
Location & Convenience #2 #4 
Location – proximity to home  High Med 
Geographic Location i.e. Vancouver  High Med 
Brand/Prestige/Reputation #5 #2 
Brand/Prestige/Reputation (i.e. Accreditation, 
admission requirements) 
Med High 
Faculty – are they distinguished (important for PhD 
students) 
Med High 
Industry networks to get a job when done Med High 
Range of Product  #3 #3 
Course Scheduling – days, weekends, evenings, 
multiple starts throughout the year (tri-semester or year 
round) 
High High 
Course Access  - when they need them so as to 
complete on time 
High High 
Curriculum - theory or research based to satisfy 
program goals 
Med High 
Distinctive (unique) Programs (Criminology, Law, 
Medicine) 
High High 
Class size/contact relationship with faculty member High High 
Student Experience #4 #5 
Experiential Learning – take courses outside normal 
curriculum 
Med Low 
Learning Experiences – international exchanges & co-
op & dual degree programs with overseas universities 
Med Low 
Responsive Customer Service – when students ask, all 
the guidance, support and assistance are available    
(i.e. career counselling and academic advising) 
High High 
Student Life/Campus Community  Med Med 
Diverse student population Med Med 
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3.8.1 Cost 
Students at the undergraduate or graduate level are concerned about the cost of 
tuition (see table 4) and the amount of financial aid, scholarships, bursaries and awards 
that are available to help provide financial assistance for those tuition costs.  In addition, 
students are concerned with the overall cost of living (housing, transportation, food) 
while they attend university.   
According to the AUCC’s document, students are carrying more debt.  “Only four 
out of 10 students graduate debt free. For those who graduate with debt, the average 
amount they owe is $24,600, with a median of $20,000” (AUCC: Association of 
Universities and Colleges of Canada, 2012).  At SFU, 52% of SFU students have debt, 
with the average amount being $21,000 (SFU - Student Services, 2012). 
3.8.2 Location & Convenience 
When choosing a particular university, location or proximity to home is an 
important factor for many prospective students.  The ability to commute from home to 
school rather than living in residences or in rental housing lowers the overall costs 
associated with obtaining a university education.  However, if tuition costs were to 
increase significantly, students may consider cheaper online instructional formats.     
3.8.3 Brand/Prestige/Reputation 
There are a number of quality attributes that strengthen a university reputation.  
They include but are not limited to, high profile faculty, ability to attract research 
funding, large amounts of capital funding and infrastructure and quality and profile of 
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research produced.  Accreditation also enhances a university’s reputation through its 
strict assurance of learning requirements. 
To many students, the reputation of the university and in particular the quality of 
the university’s faculty is a deciding factor.  Often those universities with the greatest 
reputational capital also have the best industry networks.  Ties to these industry networks 
are useful to graduating students looking for jobs.   
3.8.4 Range of Product 
In addition to proximity to home, students look for the university that offers the 
programs that they wish to pursue. Students want flexibility in how and when they take 
their courses. This includes flexible scheduling on days, weekends, evenings and multiple 
starts throughout the year.  Students also want smaller class sizes and the ability to 
interact directly with faculty. Most importantly, students want sufficient access to their 
courses such that they are not prevented from graduating on time.  With rising tuition, 
textbook and housing costs, students want to finish their degrees on time.  
3.8.5  Student Experience 
As shown in Table 15, students prefer to go to a school that provides a good social 
experience one that includes a sense of student life and community and a place with a 
diverse student population. Students also want to take their courses outside the normal 
curriculum and have flexibility when choosing their majors. Further, students are looking 
for responsive customer service.  Therefore, universities need to have the student support 
services in place when students come in with requests (i.e. Career Services, Health 
Counseling and Academic Advising). 
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3.9 Relative Competitive Analysis – UG 
This section lists the sources of customer advantage (customer preferences) along 
with the relevant set of competitors for comparison of the main customer preferences and 
assesses the relative strength of each competitor. The table below summarizes the sources 
of relative competitive advantage.  Unmarked cells indicate that there is neither an 
advantage nor disadvantage.  
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Table:  15. Relative Competitive Analysis 
Sources of Customer Utility 
Advantage 
SFU UVIC UBC Teaching-
Intensive  
UNBC 
2011-12 Full-Time Students  17,261 15,226 40,814 No data 2,425 
2011-12 Part-Time Students 12,457 4,973 15,545 No data 1,200 
Cost       
AVED 2012/13 Tuition Only 
(one being the lowest)  
2 3 5 1 4 
Location & Convenience      
Location &Convenience      
Brand/Prestige/Reputation      
2013 Maclean’s University 
Rankings, Top 49 Canadian 
universities listed in the Best 
Overall National Reputational 
Ranking. Ranked in order 
from best to worst 
7 
advantaged 
12 
advantaged 
2 
advantaged 
n/a 
disadvantaged 
33 
Range of Product       
Course Scheduling – days, 
weekends, evenings, multiple 
starts throughout the year (tri-
semester or year round)  
advantaged     
Course Access - when they 
need them so as to complete 
on time 
disadvantaged     
Curriculum – theory or 
researched based to satisfy 
program goals 
     
Distinctive Programs      
Class size/contact relationship 
with faculty member 
disadvantaged disadvantaged disadvantaged advantaged disadvantaged 
Student Experience      
Experiential Learning & 
Learning Experiences 
     
Responsive customer service      
Student Life/Campus 
Community  
disadvantaged     
Fraser International College advantaged disadvantaged disadvantaged disadvantaged disadvantaged 
Source: (p. 118 for # of full and part time students) 2013 University Rankings (Maclean's Magazine, 2012) 
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3.9.1 Cost of Tuition 
The table below shows that the per student tuition at various research universities 
ranges from $4.7K to $5.0K per year. This is largely due to the government’s annual 2% 
cap on tuition increases.     
Table:  16. Cost of Tuition 
Institution 2011/12 Tuition 2012/13 Tuition % Increase 
SFU 4,914 5,013 2% 
UBC 4,608 4,700 2% 
UVIC 4,862 4,959 2% 
UNBC 4,629 4,722 2% 
Teaching-Intensive Univ. 3,824 3,900 2% 
Source: Reproduced from Education Costs (Ministry of Advanced Education, Innovation and Technology, 
pp. 1-3) 
These amounts however do not include the Compulsory Ancillary Fees that when 
added could change the rank order as noted in the table below with the 2010 MacLean’s 
University Rankings.  
Table:  17. Maclean’s University 2010 Rankings Tuition and Ancillary Fees 
Institution Tuition Compulsory 
Ancillary Fees 
Total 
UBC (Arts) 4,518 1,607 6,125 
UBC (Science) 4,814 1,607 6,426 
SFU 4,815 745 5,547 
UVIC 4,766 708 5,474 
UNBC 4,538 823 5,361 
Source: Reproduced from 2010 University Rankings (Maclean's Magazine, 2010, p. 161 & 162) 
The table shows that universities in B.C. do not aggressively compete on price 
(tuition). What we can infer from the information presented is that there is no apparent 
advantage from a price perspective. 
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3.9.2 Location and Convenience 
Given that students prefer to go to school in close proximity to home, the 
catchment area where the university is located is important.  SFU has a campus in Surrey, 
one of the largest growing municipalities in Canada allowing it to have a strategic 
advantage over UBC.  Further, were the government to award additional UG FTE’s, it 
would probably be in Surrey given its current growth status. Therefore, though SFU 
cannot compete on size with UBC, the strategic campus location in Surrey may provide 
SFU with additional government funding in the future.  However, Kwantlen is also 
located in Surrey and therefore any new FTE funding may be split between Kwantlen and 
SFU, thereby reducing SFU’s competitive advantage.   
3.9.3 Brand/Prestige/Reputation 
A university’s competitive advantage is heightened through its brand, prestige and 
reputation. The brand and reputation of an institution helps employers to differentiate 
between potential job applicants. For that reason, many students when choosing a 
particular university make their choices based on the brand, reputation and prestige of 
that university.   
 Using data extracted from the 2013 Maclean’s University Rankings, Best Overall 
National Reputational Ranking that considers highest quality, most innovative and 
leaders of tomorrow, out of 49 universities listed UBC ranked 2nd, SFU 7th, UVIC 
12th and UNBC 33rd.  No data was listed for the University Colleges.  In the 
rankings, SFU consistently ranks in the top 25%.  It ranked 1st in the comprehensive 
category places in Canada, ahead of UVIC (Maclean's Magazine, 2012, p. 106). 
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 UBC has a traditional university personality.  Its promotional material is formal.  
UBC is staking out the market looking for the best and the brightest rather than just 
the K-12 segment. UBC’s competitive advantage comes from its size, its huge 
endowment, the law and medical schools and its name.  UBC has huge name 
recognition and has been around for 150 years. UBC is competing for Canadian and 
international dominance or U.S. “Ivy League” status. 
 SFU has a very different personality from UBC.  SFU is a place to go for future 
game changers and focuses on what the student wants.  SFU celebrates the local 
communities, for they are considered part of the fabric. A quote from SFU’s 
2012/13 promotional flyers asks the question “Who are you really? – Are you more 
ambitious and driven than most? Fearless and always curious? And are you a great 
team player and, at the same time, a bit of a rebel too? YES?  Then you can expect 
to flourish at SFU?  In contrast to UBC, SFU is targeting the local markets and the 
K-12 segment. 
 Accreditation in a number of programs enhances reputation and brand (e.g. NCAA 
Athletics; CEAB Engineering Science, EQUIS Business).  SFU has obtained NCAA 
accreditation and is the only Canadian University to hold this accreditation outside 
the U.S.  In this regard SFU has a competitive advantage over UBC, UVIC and 
UNBC.  However, the other universities also have accredited programs. 
 SFU is pursing full university status accreditation with the Northwest Commission 
on Colleges and Universities (NWCCU) in the U.S.  If obtained, SFU will be the 1st 
Canadian university to be accredited outside the U.S.  This will help bolster SFU’s 
  57
reputation in the area of international student recruitment efforts and hopefully 
enhance SFU’s competitive advantage. 
 The teaching-intensive universities as a group generally offer smaller class sizes, 
one-on-one access to faculty, flexible pathways and choices and an applied learning 
focus to many of their program offerings.  This tailored individual approach fosters 
learning.  However, the university colleges do not garner the same brand recognition 
and reputation that SFU, UBC, UVIC and UNBC do.  For example, BCIT and 
Kwantlen are not included in Maclean’s University Rankings.  
3.9.4 Range of Product and Student Experience 
Students are looking for a range of program choices, multiple pathways, and the 
flexibility to take courses outside the normal curriculum. Further they want smaller class 
sizes with the ability to interact directly with faculty.  They are also looking for a good 
social experience.      
 SFU’s tri-semester model is unique in B.C. and provides students with the flexibility 
to drop in and out year round.  For example, SFU has one of the most noted co-op 
programs in Canada and the tri-semester system provides students with the 
opportunity to take advantage of co-op.  This is difficult to do with a regular/normal 
semester system.  Also, by running courses year round, classroom space is fully 
utilized.  Conversion to a tri-semester model would be a costly and time-consuming 
process for the other universities and therefore presents a competitive advantage 
to SFU. 
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 SFU, UVIC and UBC all offer distinctive programs.  For example: UBC has 
Faculties of Medicine and Law, UVIC and TRU have Law, and SFU has 
Criminology and the downtown Woodward’s School for Contemporary Arts.  
Therefore all are advantaged. 
 UNBC is a predominately an undergraduate university in Prince George and targets 
students who live within close proximity. UNBC does not offer the number of 
graduate and PhD programs offered by the other three universities. Therefore 
students wishing to continue their academic education have to move.  This is a 
disadvantage when compared to UVIC, SFU and UBC.  
 The teaching-intensive universities (e.g. Kwantlen, BCIT) compete by being able to 
attract students who are seeking a gradual transition from high school to university, 
students who may not be ready for the traditional university experience.  They also 
compete by offering a number of skills-based programs that prepare students for a 
specific job when they graduate.  In addition to the skills based programs, the 
flexible options, applied learning, range of program choices and student support 
services, the university colleges offer  smaller class sizes (i.e. 75% of classrooms 
across all BCIT campuses have a capacity of 30 seats or less) (BCIT, 2013) where 
students have direct one-on-one access to faculty and their real world experiences. 
These smaller classes and direct access to faculty differentiates the university 
colleges from SFU, UBC, UVIC and UNBC with their large class sizes, limited or 
no instructor access and teaching assistant (TA) run study groups in many of their 
first and second year course offerings.  In this regard, the university colleges are 
advantaged.  In addition, since university colleges have received University status, 
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SFU, UBC, UVIC and UNBC’s competitive advantage has been further weakened 
for students no longer have to transfer to a traditional university to complete their 
undergraduate studies.   
 Fraser International College (FIC) – FIC is a feeder school to SFU for international 
students.  SFU is the only university in B.C. that is affiliated with FIC.  Students 
come to FIC for their first year to receive language training and have an opportunity 
to adjust to the Canadian culture. This reduces international recruitment costs and 
improves SFU’s competitive advantage for attracting international students. 
Currently 18% of SFU students are international students.  FIC provides a unique 
advantage to SFU for international recruitment opportunities. 
 Students indicated in SFU’s Fall 2010 and 2011 UG surveys that the sense of 
community and overall student experience is an area that SFU could improve upon.  
Given UBC’s campus and amenities (more vibrant and urbanized), it can be inferred 
that UBC has an advantage over SFU.  Being located atop a mountain and more 
isolated makes it difficult for SFU to create a sense of community and this is a 
disadvantage for SFU.  In addition, students would like to have access to the courses 
they need so that they can graduate on time.  However, there are certain programs 
where it is impossible for students to obtain the necessary access to the required 
courses so that they can graduate on time.  This can be due to course scheduling or 
to the limited number of sections offered. In this regard, SFU is disadvantaged. 
 Responsive Customer Service.  At SFU, as soon as a student declares a major or has 
determined a course of study, SFU provides all the support needed and connections 
to help him or her succeed.  If a student shows passion, interest and reaches out, 
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SFU is there to help (Dalton, 2012).  Kwantlen, one of the teaching-intensive 
universities, also offers services to “assist students who have decided they want to 
succeed” noting that they have “25 student services to help student succeed”. 
(Kwantlen Polytechnic University, 2013).  This is an advantage to both SFU and 
Kwantlen, however all universities have a Student Services office available to 
provide students with responsive customer service and support therefore all are 
advantaged.  
3.9.5 Relative Competitive Analysis Summary and Conclusion 
In terms of individual strength, UBC is the largest and most reputable university 
in B.C.  In addition to offering Law and Medicine, it commands a significant research 
presence.  UBC’s medical school is the only one in B.C.  According to AVED, UBC’s 
Medical School has the highest number of seats (up to 288 per year by 2014-15) of any 
English-speaking medical school in Canada (Ministry of Advanced Education, 
Innovation and Technology, 2012, p. 3). 
In terms of overall competitiveness in the industry, SFU scored higher than UVIC 
and UNBC and lower than UBC.  SFU and UBC compete for funding and for students.  
Both would like to enhance their reputation by attracting better students.  SFU competes 
with UVIC and not only ranks above UVIC in the comprehensive category but also ranks 
ahead in the Best Overall National Reputational Ranking that considers highest quality, 
most innovative and leaders of tomorrow.  Where the teaching-intensive universities 
come out ahead of the big research institutions is in the area of class size (especially in 
1st and 2nd year courses) and contact relationship with faculty.  The teaching-intensive 
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universities not only provide an education, they also offer a community for personal 
development and focused learning.  In this regard they garner competitive advantage.   
Finally, the relative competitive analysis exposed an interesting vulnerability.  
The big universities with their large first and second year lecture hall class sizes and 
limited student/faculty interactions are vulnerable to alternate instructional delivery 
formats such as MOOCs that also promote large class sizes and limited student/faculty 
interaction.   
3.10 S.W.O.T. Summary  
The SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis identifies 
the key internal and external factors that are important in helping and organization to 
obtain its objectives.  The tables below summarize the observed internal strengths and 
weaknesses identified in the relative competitive analysis and internal analysis and the 
observed threats and opportunities facing the higher education industry. 
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Table:  18. Observed Strengths & Weaknesses 
Potentional Internal Strengths Potential Internal Weaknesses 
Connects students with employers through co-
op programs and internships thereby 
facilitating the transition to careers. 
Stagnant government FTE funding and 
annual tuition caps yet rising operating, 
salary, facilities, IT infrastructure, deferred 
maintenance costs.  Defined benefits pension 
plan that is no longer sustainable.  
Flexible pathways, tri-semester system 
(students can take courses year-round), 
choices. 
Course availability and accessibility - Access 
to the required courses so that students can 
complete on time. 
SFU reputation/brand and SFU is the only 
university in B.C. affiliated with FIC – feeder 
school for intl. students. 
Overall sense of community and student 
experience could be improved upon. 
Attitude to innovation and openness to new 
evolving disciplines (1st EMBA in Canada, 
criminology) and opportunities (experiential 
learning - U.G Semester in Dialogue) 
Large 1st and 2nd year class sizes with  
limited faculty interaction and TA led study 
groups increases vulnerability to MOOCs. 
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Table:  19. Observed Opportunities & Threats 
Potential Environmental Opportunities Potential Environmental Threats 
Increased use of online technology - different 
instructional modes can lead to lower costs, 
new customers, and increased course access 
and availability. 
MOOC (Online learning) and asynchronous 
education.  The threat of global competition 
for students who can take an online degree 
anywhere in the world.  
MOOCs vs large >200 lecture halls with TA 
led study groups. Is a MOOC any different?  
Increase buyers by offering more skills-based 
training. 
Rising criticisms that universities are not 
providing students with the skills necessary to 
get jobs. 
Take advantage of technology (alternative 
instructional models) to enhance university 
education by providing interactive and 
engaging learning experiences and that take 
into account different learning styles – 
adaptive learning. 
Market demand – (1) flattening trend of the 
projected number of graduating grade 12 
students. A trend expected to continue for the 
next 10 years. (2) shift in what students 
demand (to skills-based – business and 
engineering)  
Consider partnering with a MOOCs provider 
for certain 1st & 2nd year course offereings. 
Globalization and changing demographics 
(growth in mature adult learners, aging 
population). 
Leverage partnerships/collaborations with 
other universities locally and globally. 
 
Rapid rise in the number of universities being 
built in China => uncertainty regarding the 
continued growth in international student 
enrolments. Star faculty may be recruited by 
the Chinese Universities offering higher 
salaries. 
Public/Private partnerships with industry. Reduction of government funding to higher 
education. 
 Mobility and transferability for the global 
economy. 
3.11 External Analysis Summary & Conclusion 
SFU and its competitors all compete for students, government funding and try to 
provide students with flexible program choices and engaging learning experiences.  
Further, all try to differentiate themselves by offering unique programs, small class sizes, 
or through brand recognition.  In these cases, competitive differences were noted. The 
external industry analysis helps to provide insights into where an organization’s 
opportunities and threats are.  
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A review of Porter’s Five Forces suggests that there is a need for the post-
secondary institutions in B.C. to be cognizant and attune to the changing global landscape 
(globalization) and the increasing importance of technology.  These factors could erode 
and disrupt the existing barriers to entry and increase the availability of substitute 
products. This would reduce the competitive advantage that the post-secondary 
institutions in B.C. currently hold.   
Finally, the SWOT analysis summarized SFU’s internal strengths and weaknesses 
as identified in the relative competitive advantage section and presented the observed 
industry opportunities and threats.  The industry opportunities and threats identified are 
relevant to both SFU and its competitors. They also align with the current issues 
identified in the internal analysis section of this paper. 
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4: Disruptive Innovation – Online & MOOCs 
In this section of the paper, Clayton Christensen’s concept of disruptive 
innovation is discussed with respect to the online higher education industry and the rise 
of MOOCs. This section will first define, explain and show how disruptive innovation is 
affecting the delivery of higher education. Then online education is introduced along with 
advantages and disadvantages.  Finally MOOCs, a type of online instructional format are 
introduced and explained.  
The purpose of this section is to determine whether or not MOOCs are disruptive 
and a threat to traditional bricks and mortar, face-to-face instructional formats. 
Clayton Christensen’s research into disruptive innovation is well known and his 
material is used extensively in this section to demonstrate why online educational models 
(i.e. MOOC’s) are disruptive. 
4.1 Mainstream versus Disruptive Innovation Defined 
To assess whether or not an innovation is disruptive, one must first have a clear 
understanding of what differentiates sustaining or mainstream technologies from 
disruptive innovations.  Christensen and Overdorf provide the following definitions: 
Sustaining technologies are innovations “that make a product or service perform 
better in ways that customers in the mainstream market already value. They are nearly 
always developed and introduced by established industry leaders.  Disruptive innovations 
create an entirely new market through the introduction of a new kind of product of service, 
one that is actually worse, initially, as judged by the performance metrics that mainstream 
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customers value.” (Christensen & Overdorf, Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change, 
2000, p. 6) 
4.1.1 Mainstream versus Disruptive Innovation - Value Networks 
Christensen refers to two important characteristics of disruptive technologies that 
affect product life cycles and competitive dynamics (Christensen C. M., The Innovator's 
Dilemma, 1997, p. 173).  They are:  
1. The attributes that make disruptive products worthless in mainstream markets 
typically become their strongest selling points in emerging markets 
2. Disruptive products tend to be simpler, cheaper and more reliable and convenient 
than established products  
When we think of differences between mainstream and disruptive innovation, we 
look at value networks, which refer back to how the organization delivers its value 
proposition. Value networks have distinct requirements surrounding customer 
preferences, cost structures, models for making profits, culture, and strategic direction.  
The value network of a disruptive technology will have “different attributes of 
performance than those relevant in established value networks” (Christensen C. M., The 
Innovator's Dilemma, 1997, p. 41).  For example the customer preferences and relevant 
cost structures may differ substantially from one network to another.  The overall 
business strategy for each is also different.  Each value network has a cost structure so 
that products and services can be provided to customers.  
Some of the characteristics between the disruptive innovation and mainstream 
value networks are described in the following table: 
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Table:  20. Disruptive vs. Mainstream Value Networks 
Mainstream - Sustaining Disruptive 
Innovations that sustain the leading companies’ 
trajectories in an industry 
Disrupts the mainstream trajectory by 
offering a product or service that is not as 
good as what the companies are already 
selling 
First mover not always important First mover advantage important 
High margin product focus Low margin focus - Invest in developing 
performance products that generate lower 
margins 
Upstream focus - Always looking at what your 
competitors are doing and trying to beat the 
competition 
Downstream focus 
Pursue large markets Pursue small markets  
Listen to your existing customers  Looking for new customers and not listening 
to current customers  
Resource dependence – firms are dependant on 
the existing customers and investors outside the 
firm (satisfying existing customer needs) 
Strategizing what non-existing customers 
may want. Requires that those making the 
day-to- day resource allocation decisions 
invest the time, money and energy in the low 
margin products that current customer do 
not want (p.109) 
Higher cost price point Products are simpler, usually offered at 
lower price points than mainstream. 
Mainstream has its own value network and will 
not commit the resources and attention to the 
disruptive innovation project (as success is 
uncertain and project may fail)  
Must constitute an opportunity for profitable 
growth.  Requires dedicated resources and 
support and should be set up as a separate 
business entity and not included as part of 
the mainstream value network 
Strategy is to increase profit margins.  Failure 
is not acceptable (manager compensation based 
on increased profits) 
Strategy is trial and error.  Failure is 
possible.   
Source: The information contained in the above table has been adapted from Clayton Christensen’s book: 
The Innovator’s Dilemma and is presented in tabular format to facilitate readability. (Christensen 
C. M., The Innovator's Dilemma, 1997) 
If we consider universities and look at the customer preferences, students who 
want the traditional university experience with face-to-face instruction are different from 
those looking for an online university instructional experience.  Likewise if we look at 
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the costs associated with face-to-face instruction and online delivery, online offerings are 
cost-effective.  
4.1.2 Disruptive Innovation Enablers or Elements 
“Disruptive innovation is the process by which a sector that has previously 
serviced only a limited few because its products and services were complicated, expensive 
and inaccessible, is transformed into one whose products and services are simple, 
affordable and convenient and serves many no matter where wealth or expertise.” 
(Christensen, Horn, Caldera, & Soares, 2011, p. 2) 
With disruptive innovation, the product doesn’t have to be better than the 
mainstream sustaining technology it just has to satisfy a need that is currently not being 
serviced.  Therefore, if there are customers that want it, then it has the potential to be 
disruptive.  If we relate this to students who would like the option to take their courses 
online or participate in courses that are more interactive and make better use of online 
instructional formats, then the university has to adjust to accommodate to their demands. 
Otherwise the students will go elsewhere, and given our flexible transfer credit policy in 
B.C. that option is readily available. 
According to Christenson, there are two elements or enablers that can characterize 
a disruptive innovation.  They are: a technology enabler and business model innovation. 
(Christensen C. M., Future of State Universities Conference, 2011)  By looking at the two 
enablers, we can show how online learning is disruptive to higher education. 
4.1.2.1 Disruptive Innovation – Technology Enabler 
According to Christensen, a disruptive product is a product that is at the bottom of 
the market, and is not usually as good as what the leaders are making (i.e. traditional 
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university face-to-face courses), but it is simpler and more affordable allowing a larger 
number of non-customers to use it. (Christensen C. M., Future of State Universities 
Conference, 2011) The products are “embraced by the least profitable customers in the 
market.” (Christensen C. M., The Innovator's Dilemma, 1997, p. xvii) 
 “Disruption occurs in industries where there is an enabling technology that can 
“scale” upward and allow the disruptive entrants to take their low-cost business models 
up-market.” (Christensen, Horn, Caldera, & Soares, 2011, p. 27)  Small innovative 
entrants can perfect their technology away from the radar of the mainstream players and 
for a while this gives them a competitive grace period.  Christensen uses the example of 
mini-mills’ vs. the integrated steel mills and explains how the mini-mills kept chipping 
away at the low cost products (Christensen, Horn, Caldera, & Soares, 2011, p. 27).  The 
diagram below, adapted from the HBR article by Christensen, Bohmer and Kenagy 
shows how Christensen’s disruptive innovation model works. 
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Figure 7. The Progress of Disruptive Innovation 
 
 
Source: Reproduced from (Christensen, Bohmer, & Kenagy, 2000, p. 3) 
Christensen notes that there are products that in the past have had immunity from 
disruption and sites hotels and the eating-out business (MacDonald’s) as examples.  
These are products where there was no upwardly scalable technology driver (Christensen, 
Horn, Caldera, & Soares, 2011).  For example, in the past, to compete in higher 
education, universities had to replicate the existing models, always moving up-market, 
replicating the cost structures and forms of the institutions they were trying to emulate 
(e.g. colleges in B.C. that acquired University status in 2008).  This is not disruptive.  
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However, today with online learning one does not have to replicate. Online 
learning is an enabling technology and therefore changes the game.  According to 
Christensen, “online learning constitutes an upwardly scalable technology driver that is 
capable of disruptively carrying the business model for low-cost universities up-market.” 
(Christensen, Horn, Caldera, & Soares, 2011, p. 28)  We have to consider the rise in the 
number of students taking online courses.  According to Christensen, “in 2003, roughly 
10% of students took at least one online course.  By 2008, that fraction grew to 25%, was 
nearly 30% in the fall of 2009 and is projected to rise to 50% by 2014” (Christensen, 
Horn, Caldera, & Soares, 2011, p. 3). 
4.1.2.2 Disruptive Innovation – Business Model Innovation 
Universities currently try to do everything for everybody with multiple value 
propositions – research, teaching and preparing students for life and careers. This is the 
model at SFU.  In addition to focusing on teaching, SFU focuses on building its research 
strength (trying to attain the $100 million club) and by offering students choices 
(interdependent pathways, whatever they want to study, major from one faculty, minor 
from another faculty).  The table below highlights the multiple concurrent value 
propositions offered by traditional universities. 
Table:  21. Multiple Business Models and Value Propositions 
Business Model Value Proposition Fee 
Solution Shops Knowledge creation (research) Fee for service 
Value-adding Process 
businesses 
Knowledge proliferation and 
learning (teaching) 
Fee for outcome measure 
Facilitated User Networks Preparation for life and careers Fee for membership 
Source: Adapted from Disrupting College (Christensen, Horn, Caldera, & Soares, 2011, p. 3 & 33) 
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Offering all three value propositions results in a very costly and extremely 
complex organizational structure.  According to Christensen, in the absence of 
philanthropy, universities could not exist.  Universities are vertically integrated with the 
argument that one has to integrate back to create knowledge.  Therefore faculty members 
first had to do the research before they could be teachers.  However, this is no longer true.  
Rarely do the students get to see the research until they have reached the PhD level.  The 
significant overhead costs are at the expense of research and teaching.  If teaching were 
separated from research then the overhead costs would be reduced. (University of Texas 
conference video clip) (Christensen C. M., Future of State Universities Conference, 
2011) 
Disruptive innovations create a new model that allows organizations to offer 
customers increased convenience at a lower cost.  According to Christensen, “using 
online learning in a new business model focused exclusively on teaching and learning, 
not research and focused on highly structured programs targeted at preparation for careers 
has given several organizations a significant cost advantage” (Christensen, Horn, 
Caldera, & Soares, 2011, p. 3).  However, adding the disruptive innovation to an existing 
business model will not result in a transformation of the model.   
4.2 Online Learning & Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) 
Before commencing the discussion regarding MOOCs and online education and 
how the two are connected, one must first understand what online learning is.  Taken 
from a U.S. survey done in 2011 by the Babson Survey Research Group, the authors 
describe online learning based on the proportion of course content that is delivered 
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online.  For the purposes of this report, references to the type of course, traditional face-
to-face, hybrid, or online will be based on the information presented in the table below. 
Table:  22. What is Online Learning? 
Proportion of 
Content 
Delivered Online 
Type of 
Course Typical Description 
0% Traditional Course where no online technology used.  Content is delivered in writing or orally. 
1 to 29% Web Facilitated
Course that uses web-based technology to facilitate 
what is essentially a face-to-face course. May use a 
course management system (CMS) or web pages to 
post the syllabus and assignments. 
30 to 79% Hybrid 
Course that blends online and face-to-face delivery. 
Substantial proportion of the content is delivered 
online, typically uses online discussions, and typically 
has a reduced number of face-to-face meetings. 
80+% 
 
Online 
 
A course where most or all of the content is delivered 
online. Typically has no face-to-face meetings. 
Source: Reproduced from Going the Distance: Online Education in the United States, 2011 (Allen & 
Seaman, 2011, p. 7) 
4.2.1 Online Learning 
Online, distance education is not new. Universities have been offering online 
instruction for some time.  What is new is the impact and potential of online university 
education and learning in a digital environment (Canadian Virtual University, 2012, p. 7).   
In Canada there is no national education or funding body for online education and 
there is no national online learning strategy or nationally supported digital literacy 
strategy.  There is also no single source where one can go nationally, provincially or 
territorially to obtain statistics on online education in Canada (Canadian Virtual 
University, 2012, p. 8 & 9).  Information is available in the U.S.  In the absence of 
Canadian information, U.S. online data will be sourced.  In a November 2012 
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Table:  23. Types of Online Delivery Models 
Primary Models Description 
Ad Hoc  Online courses and programs not based on institutional policy and 
strategy. 
Fully Online No face-to-face organized around the concept known as master course 
(course is designed by instructional design team and faculty members, 
gets replicated and is taught by or facilitated by multiple instructors).  
School as a 
Service 
Outsourcing/partnering with an external company for online content 
Educational 
Partnerships 
External organizations provide portions of the online course and 
communities of practice, including a network of peer instructors 
worldwide working in similar programs (p. 90). 
Competency 
Based  
Outcomes based education (OBE).  Starts with desired outcomes and 
moves to the learning experiences that should lead students to those 
outcomes.  These can be implemented in face-to-face, online and hybrid 
models.  In Competency based education (CBE) the outcomes are tied to 
job skills and employment needs and the methods are self-paced. 
Blended/Hybrid/ 
Flipped 
Combine face-to-face with online in a structured format.  Objective is to 
make more effective use of the face-to-face time.  Students prepare for the 
class using online tools.  The instructor then uses class time to facilitate 
class participation and discussion. 
MOOCS Massive Open Online Courses – fully online courses scaled to enable an 
unlimited number of student registrants. Faculty members both design and 
lead the course. This replaces the master design concept and leverages the 
natural scaling power of online tools (p.92). 
Source: Adapted from EDUCAUSE Review-Online Education Delivery Models: A Descriptive View (Hill, 
2012, pp. 86-92) 
The online, hybrid and face-to-face educational delivery models currently in place 
in 2012 are graphically presented in the figure below: 
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For all the advantages, there are also a number of key disadvantages.  Online 
courses are expensive to develop, are not perceived, from a learning outcomes 
perspective, to be as good as face-to-face courses, are not embraced by many faculty 
members and are not for everyone.  
First, the initial investment required to develop online courses is high, however, as 
more students enroll in online course delivery, online does become more cost-effective in 
the long run.  Second, there are the perceptions surrounding pedagogy and assessment of 
learning outcomes.  Even though there have been several studies attempting to measure 
online learning outcomes few have been effective. Therefore the perception remains that 
those students taking online courses do not learn as well as those in traditional face-to-
face courses.  This is followed by faculty members’ own negative perceptions or 
mindsets towards online and blended course delivery models. In the absence of available 
evidence of the potential gains that can be accomplished through online learning, many 
faculty members are reluctant to consider changes in the way they teach.  Further, many 
faculty members are concerned that the increase in online instructional models may lead 
to a decrease in faculty ranks.  Unfortunately, universities have been slow to create the 
incentives that would lead faculty to embrace online initiatives (Bowen, 2012, p. 26 & 
27).  Online courses are for those that are self-directed, enjoy using online tools for 
communicating with other students and are not that interested in the social interactions 
one gets with face-to-face courses.  However online does not accommodate students who 
are looking for or need an environment that offers a more structured approach to learning.  
Nor does it provide an environment for students looking for the traditional on-campus 
experience found in face-to-face courses.    
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4.2.1.2 Is Online Disruptive?   
Traditional university is about instructional design and quality of the instructor.  
Online is disruptive because delivering content online is readily customizable and 
teaching can be offered in ways that are engaging.  Currently instruction is monolithic 
(single instructional style for all students).  Teaching and testing is done in the same way 
because individualized teaching is very expensive.  However we need to teach each 
student in ways that he or she can learn best, tailored to individual types of intelligence. 
Computer-based learning can be customized to the way different people learn; the various 
ways brains are wired to learn.  Innovation that will make a difference for the student will 
take off very quickly.  Disruptive innovation will change the way the world learns.  
Universities can harness the technology and use it for a strategy for success. (Christensen, 
Horn, & Johnson, 2011), (Christensen C. M., Future of State Universities Conference, 
2011), (Christensen & Horn, 2008) 
According to Vaidhyanathan online courses when done well (where faculty 
designs the courses that integrate digital and multimedia tools), “include rich almost 
constant interactions among students and faculty, constant feedback and correction, and 
space and time for conversation beyond the contours of the course material.” 
(Vaidhyanthan, 2012, p. 2) 
Christensen and Eyring refer to the quality of online courses, noting, “Online 
courses are getting better now equaling or exceeding the cognitive outcomes of classroom 
instruction” (Christensen & Eyring, The Innovative University, 2011, p. 211). 
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4.2.2 Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) 
MOOCs are an online instructional delivery model.  The MOOCs acronym, 
coined by David Cormier and Bryan Alexander in 2008, stands for Massive (i.e. hundreds 
of thousands, even165K, students in one section), Open (to anyone for free without pre-
requisites), Online (worldwide via the Internet), and Course (in a singular course).  
In Canada the first MOOCs originated as an open online learning experiment.  In 
2008, Stephen Downes and George Siemens set up a class entitled, “Connectivism and 
Connective Knowledge”.  The course was offered to 25 tuition fee-paying students at the 
University of Manitoba and was also offered as an open version for free.  Two thousand 
and three hundred people signed up (Educause - Learning Initiative, 2011, p. 1 #3). This 
type of MOOC is coined cMOOC.  The xMOOCs are somewhat different. They are 
affiliated with celebrity institutions and were all established in 2012.   
Though this paper focuses on xMOOCs, it is important to first understand the 
differences between the two types of MOOCs.  The information contained in the table 
below has been adapted from Watter’s article and is presented in a tabular format to 
facilitate readability (Watters, Top Ed-Tech Trends of 2012: MOOCs, 2012). 
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Table:  24. cMOOCs vs. xMOOCs 
cMOOCs xMOOCs 
Started in 2008 at University of Manitoba by 
Dave Cormier, Alec Couros, Stephen Downs, 
George Siemens & others 
Established in 2012 - Udacity, Coursera, edX 
Declarative, distributed knowledge 
(Principals of Connectivist/Networked-based 
learning) 
Behaviourist pedagogy (generic knowledge 
where faculty represent the knowledge centre 
and the students are the replicators or 
duplication of knowledge) 
Knowledge creation – content, context, 
connections (open learning and online 
network practices) 
Knowledge duplication – information 
transmission, computer market assignments, 
peer assessments 
Emphasis on creation, creativity, autonomy 
and social networking learning.  Strong focus 
on online discussion 
Emphasis on lecture video and multiple- 
choice tests (video-taped lectures appear 
online) 
Instructor led Instructor facilitated  
Tools: gRSShoper (users inhabit their own 
space) 
Tools: Learning Management System (LMS) 
-like platform 
Source: Adapted from information contained in (Watters, Top Ed-Tech Trends of 2012: MOOCs, 2012) 
Only recently have MOOCs attracted widespread attention and become a 
powerful force in the higher education industry.  In 2012, MOOCs became the 
educational buzzword.  In 2012, Coursera, edX, and Udacity were established and they 
are all affiliated with top-tier universities.  This differentiates MOOCs from other online 
disruptors such as the University of Phoenix or Athabasca University both of which have 
low reputational capital.  The table below, taken from the Education Advisory Board 
Company, highlights the attributes of the top three xMOOCs.   
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Table:  25. Envisioning the Current MOOC Market 
xMOOCs 
   
Initial 
Funding 
$22 M in venture capital $30 M from Harvard 
$30 M from MIT 
$10 M from U of 
Texas 
$20 M in venture capital  
$200K from Sebastian 
Thrun 
Founders Stanford computer 
science professors 
Andrew Ng and Daphne 
Koller 
MIT and Harvard Sebastian Thrun from 
Stanford 
Course 
Structure 
Fixed terms 
Automated assessment 
Lectures + quizzes 
Fixed terms 
Automated assessment 
Pearson testing centers 
Self-paced 
Automated assessment 
Pearson testing centers 
Student 
Engagement 
MeetUp gatherings 
Considering peer 
assessment 
Class discussion 
boards 
Wikis 
Active peer support 
forums 
Q&A Sessions 
Scale 62 univerity partners, 
including Brown, Duke, 
Princton, Columbia and 
Stanford 
~2.8M Courserians 
 4 languages / 
international 
MIT and Harvard 
added UC Berkeley 
and are seeking 
additional partners  
122K students in pilot 
course 
Focus on STEM and 
industry 
160K students in pilot 
course 
Employer 
Partterships 
None None Career Placement 
Program 
400+ interested firms 
20 official partners 
Source: Reproduced from: (Education Advisory Board, 2012, p. 12) and The Promise and Perils of 
Innovation Slide #21 (Education Advisory Board, 2013) 
Hypothetically, MOOCs could increase the productivity of teaching by increasing 
the transfer rate of information from one person to another (i.e. one facilitator, 160K 
students worldwide).  The current MOOCs seem to focus more on how many people 
register, not on how many people complete or drop out part way through.  Enrolment can 
be considered the “currency” and the number of registrants’ can be considered the 
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“quality”.  Since the courses are offered worldwide, there is a need to ensure that the 
content is non-offensive to anyone. Therefore the course material is generally condensed 
and structured to appeal to the masses in simplified form.  MOOCs are facilitated rather 
than instructor-led and often have no required assignments or grades. Course instruction 
focuses on knowledge duplication (behaviourist pedagogy) rather than knowledge 
transfer.  MOOCs promote openness and flexibility, where individuals take learning into 
their own hands by making choices (e.g. choices to sign up, choices to drop out).  Overall 
course completion rates range from 10% - 12% (Kolowich, Coursera looks to harness the 
free labor of its devotees, 2012, p. 1).  Some likely reasons for the low completion rates 
are: course methodology (doesn’t keep people motivated), lack of social interaction and 
lack of individual drive.  
Many of the advantages sited in the preceding section for online education are the 
same for MOOCs. However, there are a few additional advantages they have over online 
courses: 
 MOOCs provide access to learning without the overhead of a physical school 
 MOOCs are available, for free, from private companies and public and private 
universities throughout the world (Futurelearn in the U.K., Berlin-based start-up 
iversity, edX in the U.S.)  
 Transformative experience (since the class lends itself to collaboration)   
 Students can take a MOOCs course as a refresher or to brush up on material prior to 
commencing a full-time university program. 
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 Offers a low-cost testing ground into ways that can be used to engage students in 
remote locations by using video, social media and new learning software 
(Bradshaw, Building open-learning platforms in Canada, 2012, p. A6 & A7) 
 Student access: Enables people who cannot afford university access therefore 
provides an opportunity to reach more people 
 Enables the non-traditional student who only wants the knowledge and not a degree 
to have access to learning (i.e. mid-career professional looking to upgrade skills) 
 Skill certification and job placement (e.g. Udacity career placement program) 
 Cost reduction - provides a free way to expand knowledge for students, and lower 
cost model for universities (in the long term) 
Given that the xMOOCs are a relatively new phenomenon, there are a number of 
disadvantages in addition to those related to online courses. For example: 
 Credentialing - Students cannot complete a degree (insufficient number of courses 
to provide a degree’s worth of credit).  Why take a MOOC and pay for transfer 
credit or get no credit when you can go elsewhere and complete an entire program 
leading to a degree online (e.g. University of Athabasca has no residence 
requirement) 
  Assessment of learning outcomes and pedagogy - Assessment problems relating to 
peer grading (students grade each other based on instructors specifications), 
cheating possibilities/vulnerable to inappropriate behaviour (no proof that the 
person writing the exam online is the person registered in the course), and concerns 
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regarding the technology’s ability to provide high quality feedback and assessment 
to students.  
 Quality - MOOC courses are facilitated, therefore students do not know if the 
facilitators are the best professors or hired actors. We do not know if the most 
popular MOOCs are the best.  Most popular course does not necessarily mean best 
quality. Finally, MOOCs are based on the behaviourist pedagogy therefore we do 
not know if the students taking the courses are learning. 
 Costs – the upfront costs to develop the courses are high.  Most universities would 
not have the necessary funds to establish MOOCs on their own. 
 Business Model - currently MOOCs do not have a business model for generating 
revenues or have a real mission statement.  
 Signalling value of a university education – currently MOOCs have a low 
completion rate.  Completing a university education requires commitment (time, 
money, and opportunity cost).  This commitment is a signal of the student’s ability 
and willingness to invest in themselves and dedicate themselves to a substantial  
task, and signals to potential employers that the students are a safer investment risk 
if hired. 
In addition to the disadvantages many concerns/questions surrounding the 
xMOOCs phenomenon have been raised.  Much of the literature deals with issues 
surrounding, low completion rates, assessment, pedagogy, student overall learning 
experience and how to prevent student cheating.  Many refer to the isolating nature of 
MOOCs and claim that they fail to encourage critical thinking (Carr, 2012, p. 3).  
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Another related concern resides in whether or not MOOCs can create opportunities to 
augment learning, increase employability and academic preparedness.  There is then the 
whole argument regarding machine learning.  Is it possible to get a machine to replicate 
the experience students get at a university campus and to emulate the subtle interplay 
between students and their professors? (Carr, 2012, p. 9)  Finally there are those that 
believe that in the absence of a revenue generating business model, MOOCs are just 
another costly time-sensitive marketing tool (given that the xMOOCs were established 
with venture capital, personal financing and endowment income) and they question the 
long-term viability of the current MOOCs model. 
4.2.2.1 Why MOOCs? 
There are a number of questions surrounding why so much money has been 
invested into MOOCs in such a short time and what the motivation is.   Some possible 
reasons are: 
 MOOCs provide a live laboratory for studying how people learn, how the mind 
works and how to improve education both face-to-face and online (Parry, 2012, p. 
B7). 
 MOOCs can be used to help understand why people forget things so that strategies 
can be created to prevent it (Parry, 2012, p. B7). 
 Study which teaching methods and tools are most successful. The research can then 
be used to inform faculty as to how they can best use technology in their teaching to 
enhance the experience for students on campus (Harvard Gazette, 2012, p. 2).  For 
example, MOOCs incorporate adaptive leaning routines into their software and, 
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online tutoring systems adapt to learning styles as students’ progress through the 
course (Carr, 2012, p. 7 & 8). 
 Tool for identifying top talent to charge recruitment fee - act as a career placement 
centre (e.g. Udacity is doing this). 
 Tool for identifying the smart people - used as outreach tools to boost future 
enrolment (Educause - Learning Initiative, 2011, p. 1 #6). 
 Large and diverse forum and meeting place for ideas (Educause - Learning 
Initiative, 2011, p. 1 #7) and for networking.  MOOCs provide a large space where 
people can aggregate and network with each other (without seeing each other) in 
very personal ways. To be part of a network, much like Facebook is. 
To summarize the motives, below are quotes from MIT president, Susan 
Hockfield and Harvard president Drew Faust regarding edX (Harvard Gazette, 2012, p. 
2): 
“EdX represents a unique opportunity to improve education on our own campuses 
through online learning” Susan Hockfield  
“EdX gives unprecedented opportunity to dramatically extend our collective reach 
by conducting ground breaking research into effective education and by extending online 
access to quality higher education…new technologies and research will enable Harvard 
and MIT to lead the direction of online learning in a way that benefits our students, our 
peers, and people across the nation and the globe” Drew Faust. 
4.2.2.2 MOOCs Possible Business Model 
As previously noted, there are a number of questions surrounding the MOOCs 
business model.  With MOOCs, the partner (i.e. Coursera, edX) company benefits, not 
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the individual institution.  Some of the possible ways that MOOCs could perhaps earn 
revenues for educational institutions are:  
 Sell registrant list of the best students to prospective employers 
 Assemble data on student behaviour – develop algorithm to spot patterns in the data, 
gain insight into learning styles and teaching strategies.  This information could then 
be sold. 
 License online courses to other universities so that they can improve their offerings 
 Course is free but trade MOOC certificate for a fee for credit elsewhere. (e.g. 
University of Maryland charges $1,300 for 3 college credits (Daniel, 2012, p. 16). 
 Marketing 
With respect to possible monetization strategies Sir John Daniel refers to the 
Coursera partnership agreement that lists eight potential business models. They are 
reproduced here: (Daniel, 2012, p. 7) 
1. Certification (students pay for badge or certificate) 
2. Secure performance assessments (e.g. students pay for proctors, such as Pearson, to 
invigilate their exams) 
3. Employee recruitment (companies pay for access to student performance records) 
4. Applicant screening (employers/universities pay for access to records to screen 
applicants) 
5. Human tutoring or assignment marking (for which students pay) 
6. Selling the MOOC platform to enterprises to use in their own training courses 
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7. Sponsorships - 3rd party sponsors of courses (i.e. licensing deal with Antioch 
University) 
8. Tuition fees 
4.2.2.3 Are MOOCs Disruptive? 
If we use Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovation, MOOCs do fit the 
disruptive model.  For example: 
 Serving non-consumers.  MOOCs are open to everyone therefore they do not target 
traditional face-to-face learners. 
 MOOCs are moving up-market.  MOOCs have been around since 2008 but now the 
technology has improved to where they are a significant presence. 
 Disruptive innovations change the definition of existing quality.  MOOCs are 
leading people to question traditional bricks and mortar educational models.  
 Established firms wanting to catch the disruptive wave should set up a separate 
autonomous business entity.  Harvard and MIT did exactly that by creating their 
own MOOCs—edX—as a separate business unit (Harvard Gazette, 2012, p. 3). 
4.2.2.4 Are MOOCs a Threat? 
 MOOCs are not a new pedagogy.  Further, technology merely provides alternate 
routes to the material and makes possible automated feedback.  However, technology has 
lowered the barriers to entry.  The accelerated rate of technological advances has enabled 
the easy entrance of MOOCs within a very short period of time.  Due to the sheer size of 
investment in the current MOOCs, something will survive leading to new paths for 
universities.  The impact will lead to improvements in teaching and will encourage 
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institutions to develop distinctive missions.  MOOCs may lead universities to embrace 
uniqueness and be less imitative. According to the Education Advisory 2012 Board 
Article:  
 “MOOCs have greatly accelerated the appetite and pace of change and will 
pressure universities to adopt new instructional approaches, be more flexible about credit 
articulation, and more clearly define their unique value in a changing higher education 
ecosystem.” (Education Advisory Board, 2012, p. 4) 
Given the economic realities associated with government funding cuts, expensive 
physical campuses and increasing salary and operating costs, the real threat that MOOCs 
may present is irrelevance.  For example, philanthropists could decide to fund alternative 
educational programs rather than university endowments, traditional undergraduate 
students could try to find less expensive ways to obtain their degree by taking courses at 
multiple institutions and then combining all their credits, students could simply go 
elsewhere, faculty could leave for higher paying opportunities in Asia or, as Sebastian 
Thrun did, give up their tenure positions to launch educational technology start-ups 
(Education Advisory Board, 2013, p. Slide #28).  
In the industry analysis section of this paper, the teaching-intensive universities 
with their small classes, individualized faculty instruction, and student-centric tailored 
applied learning focus provide students with an enriching learning experience.  These 
smaller universities will not be challenged by MOOCs.  However, to the traditional 
bricks and mortar institutions with their large undergraduate classes, limited 
student/faculty contact, inconvenient course access and scheduling problems, MOOCs 
may be a threat if they focus only on knowledge transfer.  MOOCs also present a large 
threat in the area of non-credit continuing education programming. Non-credit programs 
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offered by the university target the underserved, non-customer markets.  There would be 
little value in paying for a non-credit course when one can take a MOOC for free.  The 
only reason to pay would be for those seeking a non-credit face-to-face course 
experience.    
MOOCs may be the dawn of a new technological age for higher education. The 
real threat may not be the MOOCs themselves but the unbundling of higher education.  If 
courses were bundled according to employer-specific market needs, then the definition of 
credentialing may change and this would constitute a threat to traditional bricks and 
mortar institutions. Universities will no longer have the monopoly (knowledge and 
credentialing) over the services offered (content, delivery and assessment, research, 
mentorship, affiliation, networking, credentialing, and job placement).  Other businesses 
and institutions will compete with higher education and will offer these services (i.e. 
assessment gets re-bundled with Pearson, invigilation gets re-bundled with ProctorU a 
company who offers remote proctoring (Today Daily Focus - Education, 2013, p. 2) and 
classroom content gets re-bundled with textbook publishers to e-books) (Watters, Top 
Ed-Tech Trends of 2012: MOOCs, 2012, p. 8 & 9).  The table below presents an example 
of the possible unbundling of faculty roles. 
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Table:  26. The “Unbundling” of Faculty Roles 
 Content 
Creation 
Content 
Delivery 
Learning 
Assessment 
Student 
Support 
In-House Professional 
Course 
Designers 
Lecture Capture Independent 
Competency 
Tests 
Peer Tutors 
Outsourced Publisher 
“Course in the 
Box” 
Adaptive 
Learning 
Technogies 
Outsourced 
Grading 
On-Demand 
Advising 
Open Source Open 
Educational 
Resources 
iTunesU MOOCs Online Peer 
Advising 
Source: Reproduced from Understanding the MOOC Trend (Education Advisory Board, 2012, p. 17) 
4.3 Disruptive Innovation – Online & MOOCs – Summary & 
Conclusion 
In this section, we defined and explained Christensen’s concept of disruptive 
innovation and showed how it relates to higher education.  Next, online learning and 
MOOCs were analyzed.  One thing is certain: the emergence of MOOCs has changed the 
assumptions of traditional online education.  Disruptive innovation has occurred and 
complacency is no longer acceptable.   
Hill cites four key lessons for traditional higher education institutions. They are 
adapted and reproduced here: (Hill, 2012, p. 95 & 96) 
1. Online education now consists of multiple delivery models and universities have to 
be aware of these models and technological trends. 
2. The game has changed due to the new legitimacy of online education and 
universities will now have to have a strategic plan that answers “yes” or “no” to 
online courses and indicates how that decision serves its mission or immediate 
needs. 
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3. The increase in the number of different online educational models should lower, not 
raise student costs. 
4. Online education will lead to increased competition.  It increases the ability for 
institutions to compete with one another and can help to create new institutions and 
new online programs. 
The resounding message that can be obtained from the information presented in 
this section is that MOOCs are a threat and universities should respond.  
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5: Blue Ocean Strategy Explained 
This section of the paper presents and explains Kim and Mauborgne’s Blue Ocean 
Strategy.  The overall premise of Blue Ocean strategy is to redefine current offerings and 
to compete in areas where there was previously no competition.  The purpose of 
reviewing this strategic model is to determine whether or not it can be used to develop 
SFU’s preferred strategic option.  Blue Ocean Strategy represents an analytical 
framework for firms to use when searching out new untapped markets or those markets 
where a firm’s current customers are not.  The model, which focuses on the demand 
rather than supply side of the equation, enables management to find out what the non-
customers want and why they are not currently using your products.  It will help to 
stimulate management into action and for that reason is the recommended model for 
developing and implementing SFU’s strategic option. 
W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne introduced the concept of Blue Ocean 
Strategy in their 1997 Harvard Business Review (HBR) article, followed by their 1999 
HBR article and then expanded on in their 2004 HBR article and book in 2005.  The 
authors divide the market universe or competitive landscape in which firms operate into 
two “Oceans”, Red and Blue.   
Red oceans represent all the industries that are in existence today.  Red ocean 
strategy is based on the “assumption that industry structure conditions are a given and 
firms are forced to compete within them” (Kim & Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 
2004, p. 7).  With Red oceans, the industry boundaries and competitive rules of the game 
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are known; the market space is crowded as companies try to outperform their rivals.  If 
the industries are overcrowded, it becomes hard to differentiate brands.  Profits are 
obtained at the expense of consumers and the society at large. The prospects of increasing 
profits and growth are reduced, as products become commodities.  The “cut throat” 
competition turns the oceans “bloody”.   
Blue oceans represent all the industries not in existence today.  Blue Oceans are 
largely uncharted, unknown market space where competition is irrelevant because the 
rules of the game have not yet been defined.  “Blue ocean strategy rejects the notion that 
strategy is a choice between differentiation and low cost, rather successful companies 
pursue differentiation and low cost simultaneously” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004, p. 6). 
Blue ocean strategy is used to seize new profits and growth opportunities.  It is a product 
of managerial action.  Blue Ocean Strategy is based on the assumption that “market 
boundaries and industries can be reconstructed by the actions and beliefs of industry 
players (reconstructionist view)” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004, p. 7).  In other words, the 
excess untapped demand is out there in the market ready for the taking.    
5.1 Value Innovation 
Blue Ocean Strategy is all about value innovation.  Value innovation is the 
creation of innovative value to unlock new demand.  Firms should aim for value creation 
innovation by redefining their offerings to compete in niches where there is no 
competition. Defined, value innovation is the “simultaneous pursuit of radically superior 
value for buyers and lower costs for companies” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004, p. 10).  The 
idea behind value innovation is to stop doing things in the old way and start doing things 
in a fundamentally new way.  One should ask the question: “What would our business 
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look like if we started over again (fresh)?”  By redefining the problem, this leads to 
changes in the entire system and therefore a shift in strategy.  Value innovation occurs 
when companies align innovation with price, utility and cost positions.  Value innovation 
is a new way of thinking and executing strategy, a way to break from the competition and 
leads to the creation of a Blue Ocean   (Kim & Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 2005, 
p. 13).  Value innovation takes place on three platforms; product, service and delivery.  
Those most successful, take advantage of all three platforms. To create a new value 
curve, the authors outline five dimensions of strategy.  In the table below, conventional 
and value innovation strategies are presented and compared.  The information is derived 
from Kim and Mauborgne’s HBR article (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004, pp. 5-7).   
Table:  27. Conventional vs. Value Innovation Logic 
The Five 
Dimensions of 
Strategy 
Conventional Logic 
(Traditional Barnum and Bailey 
Circus) 
Value Innovation Logic 
(Cirque du Soleil) 
Industry assumptions Conditions are given Look of new ideas and 
“quantum” leaps in value 
Strategic focus Compete at the margin, let 
competition set the parametes, 
compare rivals strengths and 
weakensesses and focus on building 
competitive advantage 
Monitor competitors, 
dominate market by offering 
tremendous leaps in value 
Customers Focus on customer differences 
Retaining and expanding customer 
base 
Build on commonalities in 
what customers value 
Assets and 
capabilities 
View opportunities through the firms 
existing assets and capabilities 
Not contrained by where the 
firms are now.  What if we 
started anew? 
Product and service 
offerings 
Compete witin clearly established 
boundaries 
Cross boundaries, within  
terms of total solution 
Source: Reproduced from HBR Article, Value Innovation (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004, pp. 5-7) 
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5.2 Four Action Framework 
Once the firm has completed the value innovation process and formulated the 
company’s logic around the five dimensions of strategy, managers then must ask four 
questions to translate the value innovation into a new value curve.  The four-action 
framework focuses on the big picture.  The framework is used to create the new value 
curve (strategy canvas).  The four actions are: Eliminate, Create, Reduce, and Raise (Kim 
& Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 2005, p. 29).  The framework provides a powerful 
tool that can be used to create a new market space.  The firm must look at every factor the 
industry competes on.  If we were to apply the four-action framework to SFU here are 
some of the things that we could consider. 
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Table:  28. Four Action Framework & SFU 
The Four 
Action 
Framework 
Criteria The Framework as Applied to SFU 
Elliminate What factors should 
be elliminated that 
the industry has 
taken for granted? 
Courses that do not create demand or have low 
demand and value (i.e. those that can be  better taught 
by the colleges or offered entirely online) 
Create What factors should 
be created that the 
industry has never 
offered? 
Hybrid instructional models that provide improved 
course delivery (through interactive tools), improved 
learning outcomes (by using a combination of online 
and face to face tools that can tap into other ways that 
people learn) and improved course access (reduce 
face-to-face from three hours to 1 or 1.5 hours so that 
more sections can be offered).  Partner with a MOOCs 
provider for first and second year course offerings.  
This would also improve course access. 
Reduce What factors should 
be reduced well 
below the industry 
standard? 
The number of 100% face-to-face offerings and do not 
build additional lecture halls (classrooms) 
Raise What factors should 
be raised well 
beyond the industry 
standard? 
The use of technology in course delivery so as to 
provide students with a more engaging and 
experiential learning experiences.  The world has 
changed: we live in a technologically connected world 
(social media) and students want to work while going 
to school. 
The areas where SFU is unique, the ones that 
differentiate us. 
Source: Adapted from (Kim & Mauborgne, Creating New Market Space, 1999, p. 3) 
5.3 Six Principles of Blue Ocean Strategy 
Once the firm has determined the new value curve (what aspects of the firms 
current offerings will be eliminated, reduced, raised and what new offering will be 
created), six basic approaches are used to remake market boundaries and create a new 
market space.  They are: Industry, Strategic group, Buyer group, Scope of product/service 
offering, Functional and emotional orientation and Time (Kim & Mauborgne, Blue 
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Ocean Strategy, 2005, p. 79). In the table below, a column applying Blue Ocean Strategy 
to SFU and higher education has been added to Kim and Mauborgne’s original figure. 
Table:  29. From Head-to-Head Competition to Blue Ocean Creation 
Six 
Principles 
Head-to-Head 
Competition 
 Blue Ocean 
Creation 
As Applied to SFU 
Industry Focuses on rivals 
within industry 
 Looks across 
alternative 
industries 
MOOCs, University of 
Phoenix 
Strategic 
group 
Forcuses on 
competitive position 
within strategic 
group 
 Looks across 
strategic groups 
within industry 
Royal Roads, University of 
Athabasca 
Buyer group Focuses on better 
serving the buyer 
group 
 Redefines the 
industry buyer 
group 
Non-traditional students 
that learn differently, 
mature adult learners, 
Asian learners 
Scope of 
product or 
service 
offering 
Focuses on 
maximizing the value 
of product and 
service offering 
within the bounds of 
its industry 
 Looks across to 
complementary 
product and 
service offerings 
(define the total 
solution buyers 
seek when they 
choose a product 
or service) 
Tap into technology to re-
design courses and delivery 
formats.  Students want to 
be able to work while going 
to school and finish on time 
(course access).  
Partner with a MOOCs 
provider for first and 
second year course 
offerings to improve course 
access. 
Funtional 
emotional 
orientation 
Focuses on 
improving price, 
performance within 
the functional-
emotional orientation 
of its industry 
 Rethinks the 
functional-
emotional 
orientation of its 
industry 
Get rid of things that 
customers get no practical 
value for, add things that 
may increase emotional 
value (help getting a job)   
Time Focuses on adapting 
to external trends as 
they occur 
 Participates in 
shaping external 
trends over time 
How SFU markets itself 
today vs the value it might 
deliver in the future. For 
example demographic 
shifts, technology 
(MOOCs, Online in K-12), 
changing students (works, 
uses social media) 
Source: Adapted from Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 79) 
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5.4 Blue Ocean Strategy Summary & Conclusion 
In this section Blue Ocean Strategy was introduced and explained. The purpose 
was to assess whether or not the Blue Ocean framework could be used in developing 
SFU’s preferred strategic option.  Examples were presented to show how the various 
aspects of the model could be applied to SFU.  The Blue Ocean Strategy can be hard to 
implement in an existing organization but still possible.  For example, Nintendo applied 
Blue Ocean Strategy when they created Wii. They redefined the problem (time needed to 
learn and play the video games), focused on the demand side, reached out to non-gamers 
to create a larger market.  They realized that there were more non-customers than 
customers so they targeted all customers (young, old, etc.).  Nintendo then went out and 
researched why their non-customers (the parents/moms) were not using their products 
(video games).  The result of their research was Wii in 2006.  Wii (a wand- like controller 
resembling a TV remote control) re-defined how video games were played. 
(Farhoomand, 2009) 
Universities by their design are not structured for rapid change and it is hard to 
know what customers really want.  Further, the internal culture is reluctant to change and 
therefore there are inherent limitations. The entrance of MOOCs and rapid technological 
advances makes complacency or even gradual change no longer acceptable.  The Blue 
Ocean analytical framework, with its demand side focus and its radical starting-over-
blank-page approach for moving in a new direction provides SFU with a way to initiate 
the needed change and redefine current offerings.   
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6: Strategic Alternatives  
The preceding sections of this paper first presented the reader with an overview 
and introduction to SFU and the higher education landscape followed by the internal 
analysis of SFU and the external industry analysis.  The paper then moved on to the 
concept of disruptive innovation, showed how the landscape is changing in higher 
education, and the threats that online and MOOCs are having and will continue to have 
on traditional instructional delivery models (face-to-face only).  Finally, Blue Ocean 
Strategy was presented as a framework that SFU can use to bolster its value proposition 
and generate improved customer utility or willingness to pay.  
This section of the paper identifies and analyzes a number of alternatives that SFU 
should consider to improve its strategic position.  Each alternative is evaluated to see how 
well each addresses the threats and opportunities identified in the External Analysis 
section. The three strategic alternatives are: 
1. Maintain current business model 
2. Develop Online courses & MOOCs to increase delivery options 
3. Hybrid model  
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6.1 Maintain Current Business Model 
SFU could continue to operate as it has been.  Maintaining the current business 
model would consist of continuing with the current face-to-face instructional model along 
with online courses developed by the Centre for Online Distance Education (CODE).    
SFU would continue to pursue full university accreditation status as a way to differentiate 
itself from other Universities and would still explore options with the Government to 
increase the number of funded seats.  For example, SFU could approach the provincial 
government to increase the number of funded seats at the Surrey Campus from 2,500 to 
5,000 (given that Surrey is the fastest growing municipality in the lower mainland).  SFU 
could also collaborate with UVIC and UBC to pursue the option with government of 
removing the tuition cap currently levied on graduate professional programs.  
Universities could then charge higher tuition rates for the professional programs, thereby 
providing options for revenue generation or at least cost recovery.  Currently many of the 
professional programs at SFU are priced too low and it is becoming increasingly difficult 
to continue offering the programs.  Also, the low cost price point can act as a deterrent 
when attracting students who often associate cost with the quality of professional 
programs.  
Janet Steffenhagen reported that the six presidents from the Research Council of 
B.C., of which SFU is part, presented the Opportunity Agenda for B.C. This agenda 
called for 11,000 new spaces (3,600 UG, 3,000 Grad, 4,400 College and Trades) over 
four years at a cost of $130M plus $51M towards the expansion of student financial aid 
including loan reductions and grad scholarships plus more money for innovation and 
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research (Steffenhagen, 2012, p. A1 & A9). SFU could continue to support the 
Opportunity Agenda for B.C.   
In some respects, the options presented above, fall into what Kim and Mauborgne 
refer to as Red Ocean Strategy.  Here we have all the players competing in the same 
environment, all trying to deal with change by getting bigger and spending more money, 
embracing sameness and not differentiating.  
Maintaining the current business model is not a long run viable option.  The 
current model does not address the financial struggles and the mounting questions 
surrounding the actual quality and value that universities provide to students and the 
society.  It does not address the impact that the rapid rise of Asian (i.e. China) 
universities will have on future international recruitment efforts or the impact that the 
population shift (older mid-career learner) will have on traditional face-to-face 
instructional delivery formats.  Further, the model does not consider the impact of 
changing technologies and greater demand for more interactive and engaging learning 
experiences (such as those provided with alternative instructional models).  Finally the 
model does not consider the impact that MOOCs are having. 
MOOCs and online education are transforming higher education.  MOOCs are 
disruptive, causing an upheaval and forcing education to be transformed.  The elite 
universities are widening their scope and increasing their scale.  They are “opening new 
opportunities for the agile and threatening doom for the laggard and mediocre” (The 
Economist, 2012, p. 101).  As noted previously in this paper, online education in not new, 
but in 2012, we saw the power of technology.  To summarize that power, in January 2012 
Sebastian Thrun, a computer science professor at Stanford, quits his tenure track position 
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and with $5M from investors and personal money started Udacity.  By October 2012 
Udacity had raised $15M from investors.  In April 2012, Andrew Ng and Daphne Koller, 
with $16M in venture capital, launched Coursera in the US, of which eight of the 33 
partners are foreign, with the University of Toronto being one of them.  Then in May, 
Harvard and MIT each contributed $30M of their own money to launch edX (The 
Economist, 2012, p. 101). In December, Futurelearn LTD, a new MOOC platform, 
consisting of a consortium of 12 (19 as at March 2013) British providers led by The Open 
University, was formed (Watters, 2012, p. 4). Finally, in March 2013, Berlin-based start-
up iversity joins the MOOCs trend giving continental Europe a MOOCs presence 
(Lomas, tech crunch - Berlin Based iversity, 2013, p. 2). 
6.2 Develop Online and MOOCs to Increase Delivery Options 
In addition to the current face-to-face instructional programs, SFU could develop 
complete online degree program offerings.  This would provide students with the option 
of both face-to-face and online instructional delivery models.  Greater use of online 
course delivery could help address SFU’s current course access problems and improve 
course/program completion times.  It may also provide students with a cheaper tuition fee 
option.  However, students interested in pursuing an online degree program would 
probably be better served by taking the program at a university that is set up only for 
online course offerings, for example, University of Athabasca or Royal Roads.  These 
universities do not have the high overhead costs (facilities, research etc.) that traditional 
universities have and are therefore able to provide students with more specialized service 
at a lower cost.  Further, students are looking for lower cost options with more flexibility 
so that they can work part-time while going to school.  Therefore it is unlikely that SFU 
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can compete with the online universities for students.  Finally, we know from the section 
on disruptive innovation that online education is a technology enabler for higher 
education and that simply adding the disruptive innovation into an existing business 
model will not result in a transformation of the model.  According to Christensen et al, 
“the existing model co-opts the innovation to sustain how it operates.” (Christensen, 
Horn, Caldera, & Soares, 2011, p. 3) Therefore, development of online programs in 
addition to everything else SFU currently offers would be costly and would not add any 
real value. 
For the same reasons outlined above, developing a MOOCs platform would not 
present much in the way of additional benefits to SFU.  There are a number of other 
reasons why embarking on MOOCs is not strategically advantageous at this time.  They 
are: 
 There is still no profit-generating model for MOOCs. 
 The recent MOOCs were all started in 2012; therefore there is little evidence 
available regarding learning outcomes.  
 The content of fully online pedagogies often does not lend itself to rigorous 
assessment.  The offerings are not currently designed with assessment in mind. 
(Bowen, 2012, p. 27)  MOOCs are more about quantity and number of registrants 
than about quality. 
 SFU could purchase pre-packaged MOOCs courses, however MOOCs are mainly a 
one-size fits all model, therefore any courses that SFU may wish to purchase may 
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not be customizable.  If they were customizable, it is unlikely that this would be 
cost- effective. 
 SFU could custom-build an open-source xMOOCs software using Google Course 
Builder.  SFU could go in, using Google’s eco-system, access the codes and modify 
them, without restriction, as needed.  However, given the stringent B.C. Freedom of 
Information and Privacy Association (FIPA) regulations in place, SFU would 
probably want to build a platform in-house, perhaps in an open-source cloud format. 
(Daniel, 2012) 
 There are also substantial start-up costs associated with online course development 
and the sheer cost of creating an in-house MOOC platform would be prohibitive. 
One needs only to look at the significant amount of founders’ money and venture 
capital that has been invested into Udacity, Coursera and edX.  
 SFU may not have the necessary financial resources or the in-house talent to create 
the sophisticated online learning systems.  Even if possible, development of an in-
house MOOC would be inefficient, as it would not take advantage of the economies 
of scale that the elite universities have.  
 SFU does not have the financial resources available to compete at the same level as 
elite universities such as Harvard, MIT and Stanford that are already heavily 
invested in this market. 
 Why sign up for SFU MOOC’s when you can take MOOCs for free from a brand 
name educational consortium such as edX (Harvard/MIT)? 
  106
6.3 Hybrid Model 
SFU could develop a Blended/Hybrid model (face-to-face complimented by 
online instruction).  In a hybrid model, students prepare for the class using online tools.  
The instructor then uses class time to facilitate class participation and discussion. “The 
objective is to make the face-to-face time more effective by pushing the content delivery 
into more efficient online tools.” (Hill, 2012, p. 92) The model could provide students 
and mature adult learners with an affordable, good quality, and flexible, learning 
opportunity.   
There would be costs associated with transitioning to hybrid.  For example: 
“training instructors to take full advantage of the automated systems with feedback loops 
and there may be contractual limits on the section sizes of the traditional model that may 
not make sense with a hybrid model” (Bowen, 2012, p. 29). However, the arguments 
behind increasing the use of technology in face-to-face instruction are many.  
Many of the negative perceptions surrounding learning outcomes with blended 
models are not well-founded.  In an empirical study of learning outcomes conducted by 
the ITHAKA organization on a statistics hybrid course developed by Carnegie Mellon, 
two principal findings emerged: 
“First there is no statistically significant difference in standard measures of 
learning outcomes between students in a traditional face-to-face and students in a hybrid 
online format course and second the findings were consistent across campuses and sub-
groups of diverse student population.  Therefore the ITHAKA research suggests that 
concerns regarding learning outcomes in online courses may not be well founded.” 
(Bowen, 2012, p. 28 & 29). 
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Traditional face-to-face education assumes that all students learn the same way 
however, we know that individuals learn differently.  Even the assigned course textbooks 
by their very nature are fixed and static (Christensen & Horn, 2008, p. 18).  The 
technology now exists to teach students how to learn.  Traditional lectures could be 
replaced with a blended model that provides a platform for dynamic interaction.  Courses 
can be re-designed in such a way that encourages active student participation and 
includes a more engaging set of activities.  For example, faculty could integrate online 
discussion tools into their courses such as: real-time dashboards that promote progress 
over time and in daily activity, reward badges that motivate quality contributions and 
peers that vote both questions and answers “up” or “down” based on usefulness 
(Education Advisory Board, 2012, p. 21).  
Classrooms can be technologically enabled to facilitate group work and team 
learning (good pedagogy and preparation for the workforce). The use of technology 
would allow the students to provide immediate and frequent feedback in class.  
Instructors could use assistants (UG and Grad) to provide additional support.  Instructor-
led class time could then be decreased with more time devoted to discussion, problem 
solving and questions.  
Courses could consist of a combination of multi-media lessons, tutorials, student 
discussion forums and peer tutoring and one-on-one instructor/student sessions.  This is 
all possible, because the underlying technology offers advantages in cost and ease of use.  
In this way the instructor becomes a curator and guide in the collective learning process 
(Education Advisory Board, 2012, pp. 19-21).   For example, at University of North 
Carolina at Charlotte’s physics program, “by replacing the traditional two-lectures-per-
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week model with a blended model, they were able to reduce the drop/fail/withdraw rate 
by 12%, expand enrollment cap by 45% and achieve significant cost savings per student 
in one semester” (Education Advisory Board, 2012, p. 18). 
Other benefits could be around course access, course scheduling, and time costs 
incurred by students.  Available classroom space is a premium and by re-designing 
courses there may be more available classroom space.  In this way, it may be possible for 
the same faculty member to lead more sections of a course. The hybrid model could 
provide simplifications in scheduling.  Further, if the instructional format incorporated 
analytical tools that could identify early on students’ individual learning abilities, the 
course could be tailored to accommodate individual learning styles.  Students may then 
be able to reduce their time to completion by accelerating their passage through the 
program (Bowen, 2012, p. 29).  
A hybrid model can incentivize pedagogical changes.  In the table below, taken 
from the Advisory Board article, the authors show how a hybrid instructional model can 
incentivize pedagogical change.  
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Table:  30. Incentivizing Pedagogical Change 
Provided Centralized 
Instructional Design 
Support 
Focus on New Hires to 
Create Culture of Innovation 
It’s Not about 
Technology.  It’s About 
Assessment 
Typical Problem: Typical Problem: Typical Problem: 
Multiple, duplicative 
services 
Political capital spent trying to 
convert external skeptics 
Faculty recoil at “online” 
and “machine-aide” 
teaching 
No integration of tech & 
instructional design expertise 
Research remains the priority Wasteful tech investments 
Exemplar Model: Exemplar Model: Exemplar Model: 
Center for Teaching & 
Learning 
Faculty Development Institute 
focuses on new hires 
Faculty required to submit 
self-assessment studies 
yearly 
Staff directly involved with 
course design at all levels 
100s of short courses available 
on every facet of teaching 
Agnostic about end 
product; experimentation 
encouraged 
UNC Charlotte Virginia Tech University of Alabama 
Source: Reproduced from Understanding the MOOC Trend (Education Advisory Board, 2012, p. 20) 
There are lessons that can also be learned from the gaming world and 
incorporated into re-designed courses.  With games, there is contextual learning and 
motivational progression.  In gaming, players learn by performing tasks first hand.  The 
structure or underlying systems makes the game interesting and relevant, and since 
students learn differently, this may help some students learn.  Games also provide a sense 
of accomplishment and are motivating because they are designed to entertain a wide 
audience.  Study of gaming technology may provide alternatives to testing and letter 
grade assessments (Education Advisory Board, 2012, p. 23). 
One thing is certain, for the hybrid model to work, faculty involvement is 
essential.  To ensure quality and assurance of learning in course development initiatives, 
faculty presence in the design and teaching is imperative.  In addition, SFU’s Teaching 
and Learning unit could play a pivotal role in assisting with the course design.  This 
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model has the potential to become a deeply personalized learning model where faculty 
mentors students anytime.   
“Blending the online and in-class environment lets students and instructors make 
more focused use of their time potentially producing a learning experience of both lower 
cost and higher quality.  A hybrid course more effectively reaches students with different 
learning styles.” (Christensen & Eyring, The Innovative University, 2011, p. 278) 
To conclude, the hybrid model will respond to and support the customer 
preferences noted in the external industry analysis section of this paper and will also 
expand upon our current use of experiential learning practices.  At the same time, the 
blended model will continue to provide students with a physical place for learning and 
access to mentors and faculty to guide them through the learning process. 
6.4 Strategic Cooperation 
  We know that the landscape is changing rapidly.  In a span of one year MOOCs 
have been established in the U.S., the U.K. and in continental Europe.  MOOCs are also 
drawing interest from Canadian universities.  For example in October 2012, University of 
Alberta joined Udacity and in February 2013, the University of Toronto and McGill 
University entered the MOOCs market by joining edX. (Bradshaw, McGill, UofT Join 
Online Learning Consortium, 2013) It is only a matter of time before other Canadian 
universities enter. Therefore, in addition to implementing a hybrid instructional model at 
SFU, it may be beneficial for SFU to consider partnering with a MOOCs provider to offer 
some of its first and second year courses in certain programs. This would provide needed 
course access, assist with course scheduling issues, provide students with choices, and 
increase student degree completion times.   
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SFU should also continue with efforts in developing partnerships and 
collaborations with other universities both locally and internationally to explore options 
that might help to mitigate any negative fallout from MOOCs.  SFU’s tri-lateral 
agreement with the BC Institute of Technology (BCIT) and Vancouver Community 
College (VCC) to share expertise and explore new methods of program development 
represents a local partnership (Dangerfield, Driver, & Ferreras, 2013, p. C4).  This 
partnership will help enhance SFU’s value proposition by providing students with more 
choices.  On the international front, the Beedie School of Business already has the 
Executive MBA for the Americas program.  Therefore it would be to SFU’s competitive 
advantage to consider offering other similar programs so that they are prepared in the 
event that the traditional university structure changes. 
6.5 Strategic Alternatives Summary 
In this section, three alternatives or options were presented.  Maintain current 
business model, develop MOOCs and online programs in-house to increase the suite of 
delivery options, and develop the hybrid instructional model.  The rise of MOOCs and 
advancements in technology has shown that maintaining the current business model is not 
a viable option.  The review of MOOCs and online-only programs demonstrated that the 
costs associated with set-up and maintenance would be too cost prohibitive and would 
not necessarily lead to an increase in student demand for the offerings.  The hybrid model 
provides a platform for dynamic interaction and takes advantage of the in-house faculty 
expertise.  By blending online learning technology and learning analytics with face-to -
face learning, the hybrid model enables professors and students to better prepare for the 
face-to-face learning experience. The hybrid model, with its increased use of technology 
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in the classroom, offers students a more tailored, engaging and enriching learning 
experience.  This section also suggested that SFU continue to develop partnerships and 
collaboration with other universities both locally and abroad and consider partnering with 
a MOOCs provider for certain first and second year course offerings.   
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7: Recommendation 
Alternative 3, the Hybrid Model is the recommended option that best meets the 
goals of SFU.  Complementary to this option would be that SFU consider partnering with 
a MOOCs provider for certain first and second year course offerings and continue to 
develop partnerships and collaborations with other universities locally and internationally 
to explore options that might help to mitigate any negative fallout from MOOCs.   
Implementing the hybrid model at SFU would entail employing a strategic 
framework that could be used consistently throughout the organization.  Earlier in this 
paper, Blue Ocean Strategy was introduced as an analytical framework.  Through the 
creation of innovative value, SFU can unlock new demand.  SFU can start doing things 
differently and make a shift in strategic focus, for example, using innovation as it pertains 
to product, service and delivery. The product would be the hybrid instructional model, the 
service would become heavily student-centric and the delivery would include increased 
use of technology. 
It is recommended that the hybrid model be designed and tested in the Beedie 
School of Business suite of undergraduate and graduate professional programs.  Beedie is 
well known for its innovative strategy, creating “niche” programs (e.g. mining) targeting 
very specific markets.  The Beedie School, through its accredited status with both the 
Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) and the European 
Quality Improvement System (EQUIS) is well positioned, especially in the assurance of 
learning area to lead the way.  
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It is recommended that a committee be set up in Beedie and tasked with designing 
a number of the blended courses for Beedie’s undergraduate and graduate professional 
programs using the Blue Ocean Strategy (that was presented in Section 5 of this paper) as 
the strategic model.  Further, it is important for the committee to include people from 
SFU’s Teaching and Learning Centre (for they can provide assistance and will be 
instrumental in supporting and facilitating the university roll-out in the future).  
The hybrid model could differentiate and position SFU.  As a possible starting 
point, it is suggested that the focus be on international students.  In China, many students 
find their courses boring because online and traditional courses are mainly professor-
centred rather than student-centred.  The faculty member lectures, while students listen.  
Seldom are questions raised.  The curriculum tends to focus more on science and 
engineering and less on liberal arts instruction.  Given the Chinese government’s strict 
control over course content, the curriculum does not focus on critical thinking.  Chinese 
students are eager to take online courses offered outside China that provide opportunities 
for critical thinking.  They are seeking intellectual interaction, the ability to ask questions 
and courses that focus on subjects other than engineering and science (Chen, 2012, p. 16 
& 17).  Students are looking for a student-centred learning experience. If SFU could 
design courses that address these needs and develop the tools to accommodate different 
learning styles, then perhaps more Asian students would want to come to SFU to study.  
A student-centric approach that transcends the language and cultural barriers and 
provides more individualized instruction in the areas that interest students would enhance 
their learning experiences. It would then enhance SFU’s value proposition. 
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Time is of the essence.  As previously discussed, China is already building 
universities and is developing programs that cater to Americans and other international 
students with the hopes of attracting a half million foreign students to China.  (Chen, 
2012).  However, Chinese students are looking for a student-centric learning experience 
focused on critical thinking and open discussion.  Beedie can offer students experiences 
that they cannot get back home.  
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8: Conclusion  
The main goal of this analysis has been to show that by taking a more student-
centric approach to teaching and by making better use of technology, SFU can strengthen 
its future position in the areas of pedagogy and learning outcomes while reinforcing 
SFU’s vision.  Implementing the hybrid instructional format will best enhance SFU’s 
value proposition and improve customer utility. 
In the preceding sections, it was shown that MOOCs and online instructional 
models are disruptive innovations.  Access to the Internet now provides people with 
access to knowledge anytime, anywhere.  This facilitates learning (Christensen & Horn, 
Colleges in Crisis, 2011, p. 41).  Electronic media has now become the standard way of 
communicating and students want to be treated as distinct individuals.  They want to 
work while going to school and they want choices and flexibility.  Population 
demographics are also changing and in the future there will be more mature adult learners 
looking for educational opportunities that fit in with their lifestyles and contribute to their 
careers.  The game is changing.  
“Success in higher education requires that institutions pursue the things that it 
does uniquely well.  Universities need to change their DNA to avoid serious disruption.  
They need to decrease the price premium and increase the contribution to students and 
society.” (Christensen & Eyring, The Innovative University, 2011, p. 399) 
For MOOCs to be successful there would not only have to be a viable business 
model, there would have to be a systematic change to how the public views higher 
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education and the pursuit of learning.  We also know that institutions such as Oxford and 
Cambridge do not see MOOCs as revolutionary or as a rival (The Economist, 2012, p. 
102).  However the rapid rise of MOOCs does raise questions regarding traditional face-
to-face bricks and mortar instructional models.  For so long, traditional face-to-face 
instructional model held a monopoly with its close bundled system of teaching, learning, 
assessment, credentialing (degrees) and control over what students needed to learn to get 
jobs after graduating.  Employers had to rely on the reputation of the particular university 
to know what a potential employee could/could not do.  This is difficult given that 
degrees and programs differ from university to university and are not consistent.  
MOOCs have the potential to open up educational resources and offer credentials that 
employers could use.  For example, if MOOCs were able to demonstrate skill 
competencies to employers that university degrees cannot, this could be highly 
disruptive.  
Christensen’s extensive work on disruptive innovation in high school classrooms, 
colleges and universities refers to the advances in technology, in particular the increase in 
online education as a disruptive force that cannot be ignored.  In his research relating to 
the current growth trends in online enrollments of U.S. public school students in grades 
9-12,  
“When viewed from the logarithmic perspective on the substitution curve graph, 
the data suggest that by 2019 about 50% of courses will be delivered online.” (Christensen 
& Horn, How do we Transform our Schools, 2008, p. 17) 
If this prediction holds, then universities will have no choice but to adopt 
computer-based learning in their curriculum because students entering university will 
expect it.  The great advantage of computer-based learning is that it can be customized to 
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meet different students’ needs. For example, there are now learning systems that can 
detect the way a student learns best (i.e. University of Phoenix undertook this in 2010).  
The system facilitates remedial learning opportunities and can connect students with 
others working on similar problems (Christensen & Eyring, The Innovative University, 
2011, p. 212). This is relevant, because if we can teach people to learn, we can help them 
achieve their professional goals and prepare them for life when they graduate. 
MOOCs are a wakeup call to universities to react, to re-think and re-engineer 
current instructional models, to look at hybrid learning, with the goal of creating a more 
effective and efficient system of learning, one that is more student-centric.  The time for 
change is now.  
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9: Appendix A – EMBA Analysis 
Appendix A provides supplemental information on how SFU’s EMBA program 
compares to other EMBA programs in Canada, and what differentiates SFU’s program 
from others. 
9.1 EMBA Industry Analysis 
Graduate business education is a large and competitive market and there are 
hundreds of universities worldwide that offer professional graduate programs.  Beedie’s 
niche programs and extensive partnerships with public, private and not-for-profit 
organizations, demonstrate Beedie’s spirit of innovation (differentiation), flexibility and 
relevance.  One example of that spirit of innovation is the EMBA program. 
The EMBA program was pioneered by SFU in 1968.  The program is designed for 
experienced, mid-career working professionals who have an undergraduate degree and 10 
to 15 years of practical work experience.  The program is about expanding knowledge 
and expertise, learning from peers and from experienced internationally recognized 
faculty members who bring real world business experiences to the classroom.  It is for 
people who want to think strategically and thrive in their careers.  
Those attracted to the program generally work full-time and often have families; 
therefore these customers are looking for flexibility when selecting an EMBA program.  
Customers are interested in a part-time skills-based program that hopefully doesn’t 
interfere too significantly with their work.  As tuition fees are often either totally or 
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partially employer funded, customers are not price sensitive.  They are also looking for 
interactive and engaging learning experiences rather than those offered in traditional 
face-to-face only lectures (professor lecturing in front of the class).  Preferably lecture 
materials are available electronically in formats suitable to a number of different devices 
for easy portability. (SFU - Beedie School of Business) 
9.1.1 Maclean’s EMBA Rankings  
In Canada there are a number of EMBA programs offered. Presented in the table 
below are the Maclean’s 2013 University Rankings for Canada’s EMBA programs.  
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to $110K at York-Northwestern.  Admission to the program typically requires a resume, 
undergraduate transcripts, and two to three letters of reference; several years (i.e. 10 years 
or more) work experience and GMAT test score.  Some schools also include an 
interview. EMBA candidates according to the table above range in age from 37 to 44. 
The list of direct competitors in B.C. include: SFU, UBC, UNBC, and Royal 
Roads.  However, there are universities outside B.C. that offer EMBA programs that are 
either offered entirely online or have a combination (blended model) of online instruction 
along with a number of face-to-face residential programs.  These outside universities, 
using alternative instructional models (blended), are also competitors.  The table below 
includes two examples of such competitors.  
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Table:  31. EMBA Competitors 
Institution Age 2012/13 
Tuition 
Program 
Length 
(months) 
Instructional Format 
(per website notes) 
SFU 41 $48,500 18 
 
Fridays and Saturdays every second week. 
EMBA America’s option available  
UBC 
(Sauder) 
44 $66,300 18 to 20 18 weeks of 1-4 intensive days 
UNBC n/a Yr 1 
$20,270.94 
Yr 2 
$13,513.96 
21 The program confers a high-degree of 
flexibility - One weekend session per 
month in a three, and sometimes four-day, 
session and two one-week residency weeks 
over two years.  The weekend format 
facilitates attendance and minimizes the 
need for work release. Quality face-to-face 
interaction with professors and peers. 
Classes that work on a cohort system which 
allow students to build a valuable network 
of colleagues. 
Two locations: Prince George and 
Vancouver 
Royal 
Roads 
40 $37,930 19 Two three week residencies, 9 online 
courses and Organizational Management 
Consulting Project 
Queens 38 $90,000 16 Only program that offers truly team based 
learning experience and personal coaching.  
There are three on campus sessions 
(opening session, creativity and innovation 
session in Jan. and strategic electives 
session in July). The balance of time is 
spent all day Friday and Saturday morning 
every other week in a Boardroom Learning 
Centre located in the home city. 
Athabasca  $44,500 to 
$48,775 
2.5 or 3 yrs 
must be 
completed 
in 5 yrs. 
All online MBA courses are paced, 
meaning there are scheduled start and end 
dates, and assignment deadlines within 
each course. Individual course activities 
vary, but participation in online discussions 
and group projects is mandatory and forms 
part of the grade for every course. The 
learning environment is asynchronous, 
meaning students do not have to be online 
at a prescribed time. In-residence electives 
are held in major cities across Canada and 
in several international locations. 
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One way institutions compete is by differentiating themselves.  In this way they 
can market their programs based on specific customer preferences.  By offering different 
instructional formats (increasing customer choice and convenience), the institution can 
increase their individual customer base.  For example, online EMBA options have no 
class limits and enable students to continue working in their current jobs.  They also offer 
greater flexibility (choice and convenience).  However, for some students brand and 
reputation are important therefore, an online blended model from Queens may be more 
attractive than a face-to-face EMBA from the Beedie School of Business.  For others who 
are not employer sponsored, a blended program such as that provided by Royal Roads 
offers the flexibility and the career options at a lower, more affordable price (SFU 
$48,500 versus Royal Roads $37,540).  
To remain competitive, business schools must always look for ways to 
differentiate.  Their strategy is one of constant innovation.  For example, in response to 
questions arising over the overall value of an MBA and the continued relevance of 
traditional approaches, business schools are re-designing and re-thinking their 
curriculums.  Some are offering specialized programs (York University’s Schulich 
School of Business offers 19 different specializations), others (Rotman) are developing a 
curriculum that focuses on problem-solving skills (replacing the standard case studies 
with live cases that managers and executives are currently trying to solve in their 
businesses) and by teaching students how to communicate clearly.  UBC as well is 
restructuring their program to be more relevant (Sorensen, 2012, p. 55). 
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